Why isn't online age verification just like showing your ID in person?

Underlying Motives and Surveillance Concerns

• Many argue age verification is a pretext for attaching real-world identity to all online activity, especially to normalize this for today’s children before they become voters.
• Some believe governments already know a lot but want formal, license-like control over internet access, similar to driver’s licenses.
• Others frame this as part of a broader “shrinking Overton window” on online anonymity and speech.

On-Device, ZKP, and Cryptographic Approaches

• Several propose device-side age checks using zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) or blind-signature–style schemes that return only “over/under 18” without revealing identity.
• EU/European efforts and digital wallets are cited, but commenters note ZKPs are mostly “future roadmap,” implementations are proprietary (e.g., tied to Google integrity APIs), and may just shift tracking to governments.
• Technical objections: any simple yes/no client signal is either easily spoofed or requires locked-down, proprietary hardware/ROMs. Accessories as a workaround quickly collapse back into de facto mandatory hardware.

Parental Responsibility vs. Practical Limits

• One camp: internet access for minors should be behind adult-controlled devices; it’s the parent’s job, not the state’s or everyone else’s.
• Another camp (including parents) says this is unrealistic: kids circumvent controls, have school devices, mobile data, and tech companies’ tools are weak or hostile to fine-grained control.
• Strong disagreement over whether “blame parents” is fair versus acknowledging structural incentives and poor tooling.
• Some suggest mandating effective parental controls from vendors, not new legal burdens on parents.

Law, Enforcement, and Scope

• Concern that porn-focused laws will expand to social media and wider speech platforms, making ID mandatory for core public discourse.
• Offline analogies (bars, strip clubs, alcohol sales) are debated: some say it’s equivalent; others say mass, permanent logging of online behavior is qualitatively different.
• Cryptographic age proofs are seen by some as a litmus test: if governments/companies ignore them, the real goal is tracking, not protection.

Effectiveness, Evasion, and Alternatives

• Many predict users will route around restrictions (Tor, P2P, foreign sites, offline sharing), undermining the child-protection rationale.
• Ideas floated include ISP-level blocking, human-in-the-loop video ID checks, content-rating standards, and client-advertised age headers—none seen as clearly workable or politically likely.