FCC chair suggests agency isn't independent, word cut from mission statement

Status of the FCC and “Independence”

• Several comments argue the FCC was never truly an “independent agency” in the constitutional sense because its statute lacks explicit “for-cause” removal protection for commissioners, unlike the FTC or Fed.
• Under this view, commissioners are removable at will by the president, so the FCC is functionally part of the executive and aligned with presidential policy.
• Others counter that “independent agency” is a well-established legal category based on structure (multi‑member commissions, staggered terms, for‑cause removal where present) and congressional design, not vibes.

Unitary Executive Theory and Constitutional Design

• Supporters of the chair’s position lean on a strong “unitary executive” reading: Article II vests all executive power in the president, so Congress cannot create executive officers insulated from presidential control.
• Detractors argue this is a modern, partisan expansion of presidential power, not compelled by text, and that the founders feared concentrated executive authority.
• There is disagreement over how much weight to give original intent, the Federalist Papers, and 18th‑century structures in a vastly larger modern state.

Supreme Court Precedent and Upcoming Cases

• The thread cites a line of cases: Myers (broad presidential removal power), Humphrey’s Executor (upholding independence for certain commissions), Seila Law, and recent rulings dismantling Chevron deference and constraining agencies.
• Many expect the Court, in Trump‑related cases (including over the FTC and possibly the Fed), to further limit or effectively eliminate independent agencies.
• Some see this as correcting FDR‑era deviations and 20th‑century “administrative state” accretions; others as ideologically driven, result‑oriented judging.

Democratic Accountability vs. Technocratic Insulation

• Pro‑unitary commenters stress democratic accountability: if voters dislike agency policy (e.g., broadband rules), they can punish the president. Independent commissions, they argue, undermine that.
• Opponents respond that some insulation is needed to prevent wild policy swings, partisan abuse (e.g., weaponizing FCC licenses), and “one‑man rule” over complex regulatory systems.

Fears of Authoritarian Drift and Power Centralization

• Many express alarm that this is part of a broader concentration of power in the presidency, aided by a sympathetic Court: weakening independent agencies, limiting judicial checks, and pressuring the Fed.
• Some explicitly compare the trajectory to corrupt or authoritarian “third‑world” democracies or “imperial presidency” models.
• A minority welcome dismantling the administrative state and even question New Deal–era uses of the Commerce Clause, accepting major disruption as the price of restoring a narrower federal role.