Some Epstein file redactions are being undone

Technical Cause of the “Unredactions”

• Many “redactions” are just black rectangles or black highlighting drawn over live text layers in PDFs.
• Copy‑and‑paste, text selection around the box, or basic tools can recover the underlying text.
• For scanned documents with OCR, text is often stored as invisible metadata aligned to the image; drawing a box over the image doesn’t touch that layer.
• PDF is described as a complex, layered, vector format where content can be stacked; simply obscuring a layer doesn’t remove data.
• Some commenters note that PDF has proper redaction mechanisms and professional tools (Acrobat, qpdf, Stirling PDF) that truly delete content, but they were evidently not used here.

How Redaction Should Be Done (and Its Pitfalls)

• Suggested safer workflows:
  • Use purpose‑built redaction tools that remove text, not just recolor or overlay.
  • Or “go analog”: print, physically black out or cut, then scan to a new image‑only PDF.
• Even print‑and‑scan can leak through:
  • Length of black bars can reveal name lengths (“length attacks”).
  • Poor marker choice can let text show under contrast adjustment.
  • Compression and steganographic artifacts can sometimes correlate redacted and original images.
• Several historic failures (TSA manual, Manafort filings, Apple v Samsung, Sony FTC case) are cited as near‑identical mistakes.

Incompetence vs. Sabotage vs. Strategy

• One camp sees this as straightforward incompetence: rushed deadlines, redeployed staff, minimal training, and a general pattern of technical illiteracy in government redactions.
• Others float “malicious compliance” or quiet resistance: staff following orders in the most reversible way, knowing the data can be recovered while retaining plausible deniability.
• A third view: the system is structurally bad at redactions on purpose—manual, slow, and error‑prone processes serve as a litigation tactic to delay or narrow disclosures.

Who Is Being Protected?

• Multiple comments argue the redactions skew toward shielding alleged perpetrators, especially powerful or politically connected figures, rather than victims.
• Specific examples of redacted corporate names and lawyers close to high‑level officials are noted, raising questions about selective protection and potential conflicts of interest.

Is “Unredacting” a Crime or a “Hack”?

• Many object to calling this a “hack,” framing it instead as simply reading data that was never actually removed.
• Discussion suggests that, for ordinary members of the public, examining and sharing such publicly released documents is generally protected speech; different rules apply to government and cleared personnel.