Seven Diabetes Patients Die Due to Undisclosed Bug in Abbott's Glucose Monitors

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Open-source / DIY diabetes tech interest

  • Several commenters use or recommend open-source and “looping” systems (OpenAPS, AndroidAPS, xDrip, Tidepool Loop) with older pumps/CGMs to avoid proprietary apps and gain more control.
  • Reverse‑engineering efforts focus on Bluetooth protocols, watch connectivity, and data decryption for Abbott’s Libre sensors.
  • One former pump engineer recalls very tight, low‑power C code on early devices and notes that adding wireless/remote control dramatically increased complexity and security concerns.

How dangerous are CGM false readings?

  • Many diabetics in the thread stress that CGMs are inherently imperfect and meant for trends, not definitive values. Standard education: if a reading seems wrong or you “feel off,” confirm with a fingerstick.
  • Several explain physiology:
    • Low blood sugar (too much insulin) is acutely life‑threatening.
    • High blood sugar is usually long‑term–damaging, but if it reflects true insulin deficiency it can rapidly lead to diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA), which can be fatal within hours.
  • There is disagreement about the article’s framing:
    • Some argue false lows mainly cause prolonged highs (uncomfortable and harmful but not immediately lethal), so directly attributing deaths to the bug is dubious.
    • Others argue extended false lows in a closed‑loop system could suppress basal insulin and precipitate DKA, especially in vulnerable or poorly educated patients.

Evidence and causality

  • The FDA/Abbott language cited is “736 serious injuries and seven deaths associated with this issue” and even “potentially associated,” not “caused by.”
  • Multiple commenters consider the headline (“die due to”) sensational or misleading, and note that “associated” covers coincidental deaths.
  • Others counter that without detailed case reports, it’s unclear how strong the causal link is, but still see the situation as a grave safety and transparency problem.

Software vs hardware, and FOSS

  • Some suspect a manufacturing/chemistry quality‑control issue in certain sensor batches; others note the FDA does not specify software vs hardware.
  • Commenters broadly agree FOSS is not magically safer—bugs and lack of clinical trials remain—but argue for:
    • Public post‑mortems and technical disclosure (hardware + software) in safety‑critical devices.
    • Stronger “software building codes” and regulation for life‑critical systems, regardless of license model.

User behavior, education, and risk

  • Several diabetics and caregivers describe:
    • Reliance on CGMs with backups (fingersticks, ketone testing, symptoms).
    • Known failure modes (sensor misplacement, “pressure lows,” motion artifacts).
    • The challenge for elderly or cognitively impaired users who may not double‑check readings.
  • Some view the incident primarily as an education and clinical‑practice failure layered on top of a device defect; others caution against over‑blaming patients and emphasize better design and safety limits in pump algorithms.