Iran Goes Into IPv6 Blackout

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Likely Causes of the Blackout

  • Many commenters connect the IPv6 (and partial IPv4) cutoff to large anti-government protests and calls for mass demonstrations, noting this matches a long-standing pattern: Iran has repeatedly shut or throttled the internet during unrest.
  • A minority suggests alternative explanations such as foreign “cyber” operations or preparation for external attack, but others argue this is strategically unlikely and that Iran already has a documented history of protest-time blackouts.
  • Some frame the blackout as aimed at preventing internal organizing more than blocking all external news.

Why IPv6 Specifically?

  • One recurring explanation: authorities know how to censor and monitor IPv4 but lack mature tooling or expertise for IPv6, so they simply disabled it entirely.
  • Others debate whether IPv6 is actually harder to censor.
    • Some say its vast address space and easier, cheap allocations help anti-censorship groups and make simple IP blocking less effective.
    • Others counter that state censors typically block at ASN level, which is equally easy for v4 and v6.
  • Deep packet inspection hardware may not fully support IPv6 or extension headers, making surveillance/filtering more complex and costly.

Shutdown Mechanics and Domestic Intranet

  • Iran’s connectivity is diverse at the edge but bottlenecked at national gateways (TIC), enabling centralized shutoffs or throttling ISP-by-ISP.
  • Commenters describe a developing nationwide intranet that keeps critical internal services (especially payments) running while international traffic is cut, though it’s imperfect and disruptive.

Starlink and Alternative Channels

  • Discussion notes thousands of Starlink terminals in Iran, likely smuggled and funded via NGOs/black market, but still serving a tiny fraction of the population (~0.1% by one cited figure).
  • Starlink is seen as crucial for leaking protest footage, but too sparse to support mass internal coordination.
  • Thread explores feasibility of jamming or destroying Starlink (RF jamming, ASAT, space debris), with consensus that large-scale denial is technically and politically difficult for Iran.

Tools, Workarounds, and Limits

  • VPNs (Psiphon, Proton, etc.), Tor bridges, DNS tunneling, mesh tools (Yggdrasil, Briar, Reticulum, LoRa/mesh, sneakernet) are discussed as possible circumvention paths, but deployment and usability at scale are limited.
  • Some note that even with IPv4 still up, heavy filtering can cripple VPN/Tor; blocking remains a cat-and-mouse game.

Political and Social Context

  • Iranian commenters emphasize this wave of protests targets “the regime as a whole,” not just a policy, and that shutdowns accompany killings and crackdowns.
  • There is sharp debate over whether the system is a genuine republic or a de facto theocratic monarchy, and whether unrest is primarily domestic or foreign-fueled.
  • Several point out the severe economic, water, and quality-of-life crises as underlying drivers of unrest, with skepticism toward narratives blaming everything on foreign interference.