Network of Scottish X accounts go dark amid Iran blackout

Who is being targeted and why?

  • Commenters debate whether such obviously absurd posts (“tanks on the Royal Mile”, “Balmoral seized”) are meant for Scots at all.
  • Proposed target groups:
    • Scots, to inflame nationalism or stir internal UK division and potential violence.
    • Foreign audiences (especially Americans) to reinforce narratives that the UK/Europe are chaotic, authoritarian “hellholes”.
    • General “conspiracy‑prone” users, not the average citizen.

Effectiveness and style of the disinfo

  • Many argue the specific claims are too ridiculous to sway normal Scots, but others note:
    • Even fringe believers can matter if they act violently or amplify content.
    • The goal may be not persuasion on one issue but saturating the infosphere so people give up on knowing what’s true (“epistemological bankruptcy”).
  • Some point out these accounts also posted more plausible, banal pro‑independence content to build credibility, with the wild stuff as occasional spikes.

Geopolitics, Scotland, and foreign interests

  • Several see this as classic “divide and weaken” information warfare: push both nationalist and unionist extremes so the UK spends energy on internal conflict.
  • Speculation about motives includes:
    • Undermining UK stability, nuclear posture, and Scotland’s role in North Atlantic defence.
    • A (disputed) theory that Scottish independence could disrupt the UK’s UN Security Council status.
  • Others note Scotland’s actual EU / trade / fiscal realities, stressing that foreign agitators can only exploit pre‑existing, genuine debates.

Bots, sockpuppets, and the “firehose of falsehood”

  • Multiple comments connect this to broader Russian/Iranian (and Western) “firehose of falsehood” tactics: vast volumes of low‑quality, contradictory propaganda to exhaust critical thinking.
  • Others suggest many such accounts may be profit‑seeking scammers (e.g., building engagement to pivot to crypto or ads) who sometimes double as tolerated state proxies.

Skepticism about sources and narratives

  • Some are wary that the investigation itself relies on a commercial disinfo‑analysis firm with its own clients and agendas.
  • A minority view the entire framing as part of anti‑Iran propaganda, noting current geopolitical tensions.

Broader social media and platform design issues

  • Long subthreads generalize to:
    • How easy it is for states and scammers to run influence ops on X/Reddit/Facebook.
    • Proposals for strong ID verification or location disclosure versus anonymity and privacy.
    • Concerns that HN and other forums also host sockpuppets and nudging campaigns, though some moderators claim inauthentic actors are detectable over time.