Briar keeps Iran connected via Bluetooth and Wi-Fi when the internet goes dark

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Briar’s Design and What It Actually Does

  • Works peer‑to‑peer over Bluetooth, local Wi‑Fi and Tor, with no central server.
  • Content types matter:
    • Private chats require both peers to eventually be directly reachable.
    • Forums/groups sync and re‑host each other’s posts, giving multi‑hop spread among trusted contacts.
    • “Blog” posts can propagate widely as each user republishes to their own contacts.
  • “Mailboxes”/collectors can be placed at fixed points to sync messages opportunistically.

Practical Limits and Usability

  • Several commenters see Briar mainly as an emergency/offline text tool: slow desktop client, weak media support, undeletable forums, and clunky UX.
  • Bluetooth range and lack of automatic multi‑hop relaying are viewed as major constraints in practice.
  • Others argue that in disasters or blackouts, even short‑range, delay‑tolerant text between hubs (community centers, relief points) is valuable.

iOS, App Stores, and Platform Control

  • No iOS version; Briar devs say it’s unlikely without Apple changing background networking and distribution rules.
  • Some speculate on ad‑hoc iOS app sharing (AirDrop, custom stores) but conclude it’s painful or impossible.
  • Broader concern: Apple/Google lock‑in, account lockouts, content scanning and the ability to remove or silently disable “dangerous” apps on government request.

Is It Really Keeping Iran Connected?

  • The linked resource is just the Farsi manual.
  • Multiple commenters say it’s unclear whether Briar is meaningfully used in Iran; there’s no independent evidence in the thread.
  • Some call the submission title misleading or over‑editorialized for that reason.

Comparisons: Meshtastic, Meshcore, Bitchat, SSB

  • Meshtastic/Meshcore (LoRa) are praised for long range and cheap, conceal­able repeaters, but also:
    • Use naive flooding, struggle in dense/high‑traffic meshes, and are trivial to jam or DoS.
    • Past crypto flaws and the risk of triangulation are noted.
  • Bitchat is repeatedly criticized as “vibe‑coded”, unaudited, and insecure, despite being attractive for iOS.
  • Secure Scuttlebutt is mentioned as another offline‑friendly protocol but without detailed comparison.

Threat Models, Politics, and Legal Risks

  • Debate over whether states will jam, triangulate, or simply monitor low‑bandwidth meshes instead of shutting them down.
  • Some see Briar/mesh as vital against authoritarian internet blackouts (Iran, Kashmir, Bangladesh, possible future US unrest); others argue shutdowns in Western countries are unlikely.
  • EU/UK “chat control” and CSAM proposals raise fears that anonymous E2E tools like Briar could be restricted or banned in the future, though current drafts have softened client‑side scanning.