A decentralized peer-to-peer messaging application that operates over Bluetooth

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Project trust and founder involvement

  • Some participants distrust the project due to its high‑profile backer, citing past association with large‑scale moderation/censorship regimes.
  • Others argue tools should be judged on code and capabilities, not personalities, especially for open source projects that can be forked.
  • A counterpoint is that leaders shape culture, incentives, and communities, which cannot be “forked” as easily as code.

Comparisons to other tools (Briar, Berty, Meshtastic, etc.)

  • Briar is repeatedly cited as the closest prior art: Bluetooth + Wi‑Fi + Tor, store‑and‑forward, security audits, but no iOS app due to background/push constraints.
  • Berty, Session, Cwtch, Meshtastic, Meshcore, and Secure Scuttlebutt are mentioned as related or alternative approaches (often each missing some feature).
  • Some ask for a systematic comparison of BitChat vs Briar (protocols, crypto, UX, supply chain), which is currently lacking.

Use cases: where Bluetooth mesh might matter

  • Protest coordination and organizing under authoritarian shutdowns (Iran, Uganda, Gaza) and during natural disasters (Jamaica hurricane).
  • Local coordination when infrastructure is overloaded or absent: festivals, stadiums, cruise ships, caving trips, national parks, rural areas, hospitals, planes, malls.
  • Niche but real scenarios: family coordination on ships/flights, remote areas with poor coverage, disaster relief operations.
  • Skeptics note they’ve “never” seen such apps be practical at events with bad coverage; others say that’s exactly the sort of environment worth testing.

Technical design debates: range, reliability, and store‑and‑forward

  • Bluetooth range is a central concern: typical phones are class‑2 devices with ~10–20 m real‑world range; ideal BT5/coded PHY tests show >1 km, but many doubt that’s realistic in urban/indoor settings.
  • Mesh relaying can extend coverage, and BitChat now integrates with Meshtastic and ad‑hoc Wi‑Fi; nonetheless, some see BT‑only as a proof‑of‑concept with very constrained city‑scale usefulness.
  • A strong recurring critique: lack of proper “store‑and‑forward” / deferred message propagation. Many argue this is “table stakes” for real‑world delay‑tolerant networks and point to FidoNet and DTN research as prior art.
  • Others emphasize that limited retention can be a privacy feature; any message caching should be opt‑in and encrypted, with configurable retention.

Security, censorship resistance, and RF risks

  • End‑to‑end encryption (Noise XX) is seen as necessary but insufficient for high‑risk activism; metadata and RF emissions still expose who is where and when.
  • Some propose onion‑style routing and more sophisticated obfuscation; others note that any tool can be defeated by state‑level actors and physical coercion.
  • There’s concern that app‑store distribution is fragile: iOS removals in past protest contexts and lack of iOS background capabilities are seen as major weaknesses.
  • Some suspect such apps could be honeypots or easily used to locate users via RF targeting, especially when regimes jam or monitor spectrum.

Regulation, spectrum, and “why Bluetooth?”

  • Several threads argue that phones are artificially constrained radios: hardware could support long‑range P2P, but regulations, business models, and closed baseband stacks prevent it.
  • Walkie‑talkies, LoRa and ham bands are raised as more appropriate technologies for distance, but they require extra hardware, licenses, or face legal duty‑cycle limits.
  • There’s a long side‑discussion about unlicensed spectrum at lower frequencies and how different policy choices could have led to more resilient, decentralized topologies.

Adoption, ecosystem, and OS‑level support

  • Multiple users report opening BitChat and seeing “no one online”, highlighting the chicken‑and‑egg problem: the app is most useful only once widely adopted.
  • Some evidence is offered of regional spikes (Uganda elections, Jamaica hurricane), but others question how widespread or sustained that usage is.
  • Lack of iOS support, dependence on Google Play Services, and mobile OS background limits are seen as major barriers.
  • Several commenters suggest OS‑level P2P messaging (e.g., from large vendors) would be more realistic than app‑store‑distributed tools, but doubt carriers and governments would tolerate it.

Overall sentiment

  • Many view BitChat as an interesting and timely experiment with important ideas (infrastructure‑independent messaging, multi‑transport mesh).
  • Others see it as too range‑limited, fragile, and incomplete (especially without robust store‑and‑forward) to materially change outcomes in serious crises—at least in its current form.