Macron says €300B in EU savings sent to the US every year will be invested in EU
Macron’s claim and numbers
- Many doubt the €300B figure, calling it “made up” or at least very fuzzy.
- Unclear what’s included: US bonds, equities, pensions, military spending, or “everything” is suggested, but no consensus.
- Others note the EU already holds about $8T in US assets; €300B/year is small relative to that stock.
Capital flows, currencies, and “imbalances”
- One line of argument: without formal or de‑facto capital controls, investors will still send money where returns are highest, so rhetoric won’t change much.
- Counterpoint: you can make foreign investments unattractive via extra taxes, reporting requirements, PFIC-style rules, etc. Critics reply that this is capital control in disguise and politically unrealistic for a 27‑member EU.
- A side debate disputes whether trade imbalances “exist” in any meaningful way under floating exchange rates; one commenter calls them an accounting artifact, which others challenge.
- Some stress that selling US assets at scale is nontrivial: liquidity limits, what to buy instead, and riskier destinations (commodities, emerging markets, gold) are brought up as problematic.
Politics, Trump, and US risk
- Several see Macron’s line as a PR response to Trump’s bullying style, even mimicking his exaggerated rhetoric.
- There’s extensive discussion of US deficits, rising federal debt, dollar devaluation vs euro, and whether this undermines US assets.
- Examples of Swedish, Danish, Indian, and Chinese reductions in US treasuries are cited; others argue those moves are small, trend‑driven, or market‑rational rather than purely political.
- Some Europeans say they’re divesting from the US on political or rule‑of‑law grounds; others see that as overreacting or mixing ideology with portfolio decisions.
EU structural weaknesses
- Several argue that the core problem is not where savings go, but Europe’s lack of profitable investment opportunities and slow growth policies.
- EU’s difficulty in ratifying the Mercosur trade deal is used as evidence the bloc struggles to do “bold” things, including capital-market reform.
- Concerns about agricultural resilience and standards (chemicals, hormones, traceability) drive skepticism of trade deals, which in turn hurt EU’s credibility as a partner and risk strategic isolation.
Savings, pensions, and investment culture
- Commenters highlight the EU’s much higher measured household savings rate vs the US, but note definitional issues (do pensions and market investments count as “savings”?).
- In much of Europe, people save more in bank deposits and mandatory pensions; in the US, more household wealth sits in markets (401(k)s, equities, etc.).
- Some think redirecting pension savings into EU stocks might raise valuations and innovation; others warn of political backlash if people are forced into “shitty EU stocks” and note that underfunded public pensions won’t be fixed by relabeling where they invest.
Feasibility and impact
- Multiple questions remain unanswered in the thread:
- What concrete EU‑level instrument would move €300B/year?
- What authority a single national leader has over ECB, other member states, and private capital?
- Whether any significant change is politically achievable given diverging interests (e.g., FDI‑dependent states).
- Some point out that if Europeans sell US assets and prices fall, American retirees could buy them cheaper; Europe might lose upside more than the US.