Spanish track was fractured before high-speed train disaster, report finds

Track monitoring and defect detection

• Commenters list multiple existing systems: dedicated measurement trains with cameras, LIDAR, lasers, ultrasonic flaw detection (USFD), “Doctor Yellow”-type high‑speed inspection trains, wheel impact load detectors, acoustic/strain/IR/camera systems, and traditional walking inspections.
• Some argue every train should carry basic condition sensors; others note underframes are crowded and hardware is bulky/industrial.
• Track‑circuit continuity and time‑domain reflectometry are mentioned as rail‑break monitors, but not always compatible with modern high‑speed signalling; axle counters are common.
• There is frustration that several trains passed the defect (wheel “notches” were later found) without any system flagging it.

Nature and evolution of the fracture

• The visible ~40 cm gap is described as enormous; several people stress this size likely resulted from the derailment itself, not the initial defect.
• The failure point was at a welded joint between older (1989) rail and a newly renewed segment; discussion clarifies that weld metal is often stronger than the parent rail, with weakness just adjacent to the weld.
• There is some confusion over reports that the “broken rail was new” vs “old but poorly maintained”; later comments converge on “failure at the transition between old and new.”
• Continuously welded rail behavior under temperature and tension is discussed; commenters dispute how much a cut rail can actually “shrink” given sleepers and ballast.

Barriers and alignment design

• One line of discussion asks if physical walls between tracks should be mandatory.
• Most replies are skeptical: containing a derailed high‑speed train would require an enormous structure, could worsen debris spread, increase drag/energy use, introduce new maintenance burdens, and cannot exist at switches where this crash occurred.
• A more modest idea is to place high‑speed passing points where tracks are separated by distance rather than walls.

Spain’s maintenance, inspections, and comparisons

• Multiple comments point to underinvestment in maintenance relative to new construction, but others argue that comparing “% of budget” is misleading without per‑km and age‑adjusted figures.
• There is debate over whether Spain “does not do the required maintenance” vs. whether inspection standards or execution were inadequate, given the section was reportedly renovated and inspected recently.
• Japan’s Shinkansen is frequently cited as a contrast: dense network, frequent high‑speed inspection runs, strong safety culture/accountability, and possibly higher sustainable maintenance spending per km. Some push back that two Spanish HSR accidents over decades is still statistically rare.

Frequency, sabotage, and coincidence

• Track fractures are said to be “very” common in general rail practice, but usually caught early. Several historical fracture‑related accidents elsewhere are cited.
• Others speculate about sabotage or foreign intelligence involvement in European rail incidents; this is met with skepticism and counterexamples (e.g., long‑standing copper theft problems) and reminders that official investigations have attributed some outages to theft, not state actors.
• A cluster of several Spanish rail accidents in one week is noted; some see it as alarming coincidence, others caution against over‑interpreting rare events.

Additional sensing proposals

• Ideas include: cameras watching wheels for notches, high‑speed imaging of rails, onboard impact/load monitors, and more aggressive use of existing detectors.
• Some argue simple force/impact measurement on wheels is more practical than complex vision systems; others think modern high‑speed cameras and lighting could be justified for HSR safety.