Is It Time for a Nordic Nuke?

Deterrence Logic and Delivery Systems

• Strong focus on what makes a “credible” deterrent: not just having a bomb, but survivable second‑strike capability.
• Suggested platforms: submarines, mobile road/rail launchers, aircraft, container ships, underground tunnels, and “launch on warning.”
• Debate over container-ship or pre‑positioned nukes: some see them as a way to guarantee retaliation after a decapitation strike, others argue they’re destabilizing surprises and hard to attribute, thus poor for deterrence.
• Submarines seen as the gold standard; Nordic navies (especially Sweden) are cited as having relevant experience, but nuclear-armed subs are a different level of complexity.

Lessons from Ukraine and Security Guarantees

• Repeated claim: “the lesson of Ukraine” is that any state wanting real independence must have its own nukes; security guarantees and memoranda are portrayed as unreliable.
• Counterpoint: Ukraine never truly had an operational deterrent—warheads were Russian, infrastructure was lacking, and maintaining a serious arsenal would have exceeded its post‑USSR capacity.
• Others argue Ukraine had the industrial and scientific base to bootstrap its own arsenal from inherited hardware, but chose not to.

Arguments For Nordic (and Wider European) Nukes

• Many commenters think it is now clearly in Nordic self‑interest to develop a deterrent, given perceived Russian aggression and doubts about US reliability.
• Some extend this logic to central Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, etc.) and even Canada, arguing that sovereignty now effectively requires a nuclear umbrella.
• View that a small arsenal (even “one nuke”) is enough to force any aggressor to price in the loss of a major city.

Arguments Against Nordic Nukes / Pro-Disarmament

• Others insist the answer is “no” or call instead for disarming Russia—though they acknowledge no realistic method exists that doesn’t risk nuclear war.
• Concerns: proliferation increases accident risk and chances of miscalculation; limited nuclear war is deemed unlikely, with any use having potential for global catastrophe.
• Some emphasize moral and targeting dilemmas: nukes pose more questions than they answer, especially when likely targets include civilian-heavy areas.

Feasibility, Politics, and Historical Context

• Technical skeptics argue the article understates the difficulty of enrichment and reprocessing; Nordic states lack such facilities and would face supply‑chain, political, and sabotage/assassination risks.
• Others note Sweden’s historical weapons program got close to a bomb in the 1960s and could, in principle, be revived, though domestic politics and anti‑nuclear sentiment are major barriers.
• UNSC opposition is cited as a strong constraint; North Korea is mentioned as evidence that even that system is far from airtight.

US Reliability, NATO, and European Autonomy

• Strong thread on US unpredictability (especially under Trump) undermining trust in the American nuclear umbrella and NATO guarantees.
• Some argue Europe should have reduced reliance on US deterrence long ago and is now slowly rearming and investing (e.g., artillery production), but still mostly “talks and doesn’t act.”
• UK and French arsenals are acknowledged, but several commenters doubt they are sufficient or politically guaranteed as substitutes for US protection.