House of Lords Votes to Ban UK Children from Using Internet VPNs

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Status and Scope of the Proposal

  • House of Lords vote is only one stage; the measure is not yet law and may change or fail.
  • Text is ambiguous: regulations “may” require “highly effective” age assurance, leaving room for broad or narrow implementation and heavy regulator discretion.
  • Likely enforcement vectors discussed: large fines (as with porn age checks) and ISP-level blocking of non-compliant services, including possibly big cloud providers.

Age Verification, KYC, and Digital ID

  • If implemented strictly, VPN providers would effectively need to know users’ ages, implying KYC-style checks (ID documents, credit/debit card checks, or equivalent).
  • Some argue existing financial KYC plus payment records already link accounts to real identities; others stress lawmakers/industry are pushing toward pervasive digital IDs and state-mandated identity services.
  • Concerns that financial traces (bank/credit card statements, authorizations) can resurface in legal, rental, or loan contexts; privacy and stigma issues are raised.

Effectiveness vs Circumvention

  • Critics say children will simply switch to:
    • VPS-based self-hosted VPNs, “secure proxies,” Tor, or obfuscated protocols (Shadowsocks, V2Ray, etc.).
    • Foreign VPNs outside UK jurisdiction, until or unless blocked by ISPs.
  • Supporters counter that payment, KYC, and friction (credit cards, parental oversight) raise the bar enough to reduce harm, even if not perfectly.
  • Others argue bans will push kids toward more dangerous, non‑compliant services and do little to address the underlying risks.

Motives: Child Safety or Surveillance/Censorship?

  • Many see “think of the children” as a pretext:
    • A path to eliminating online anonymity and mapping which adults use VPNs.
    • A complement to broader censorship and information control (e.g., restricting graphic war/genocide content; Gaza is mentioned).
  • Counterview: governments naturally seek more power; foreign pressure is not required, and there is significant domestic electoral demand from worried parents.

Child Addiction, Phones, and Social Media

  • One participant involved in UK advocacy frames this as part of tackling phone/social-media addiction, loss of focus, and dopamine desensitization in children.
  • Argument: network effects force even cautious parents into allowing phones/social media; legal bans and friction can weaken those effects.
  • Many push back:
    • VPN age-gating doesn’t directly address school-issued iPads, phone-in-class policies, or addictive algorithms.
    • Better levers would be: banning/limiting targeted feeds, mandating transparency, school-level device restrictions, parental education, and better parental controls.

Civil Liberties, “Nanny State,” and Comparisons

  • Strong civil-liberties concerns:
    • Normalizing ID checks for VPNs paves the way to ID for “everything you do online.”
    • Data breaches are seen as inevitable; citizens and especially children will pay the price.
  • UK is portrayed by some as increasingly paternalistic and surveillant (CCTV, prior GCHQ revelations), with comparisons to China or Iran’s information controls.
  • Some parents explicitly state they will obtain VPNs for their children and teach technical workarounds, concluding that such laws mainly teach kids that government is hostile and untrustworthy.

Meta-discussion and Inconsistencies

  • Several note the pattern where:
    • Online debates call for strong restrictions “for the children,”
    • Then react with shock when those restrictions materialize as heavy-handed surveillance and ID requirements.
  • There is disagreement whether the real problem is “harmful content,” “children’s access,” or the business models of engagement-maximizing platforms; no consensus emerges on where regulation should bite.