FBI is investigating Minnesota Signal chats tracking ICE

Legality, First Amendment, and “Interference”

• Many argue the chats and on-the-ground actions (filming, tracking vehicles, supporting families, “legal observing”) are core protected speech and assembly; they see the FBI probe as intimidation and a chilling effect.
• Others counter that if chats coordinate blocking vehicles, “de-arrests,” mobbing agents, or warning targets in real time, that can cross into obstruction, conspiracy, or seditious conspiracy.
• There is extended debate over 18 U.S.C. § 372, § 111, § 118, § 1505; one side says they require force/intimidation and don’t fit observers, the other says coordinated crowd actions and targeted “go there now” messages could qualify.
• Some frame nonviolent “interference” as civil disobedience that, by design, accepts arrest; others say this breaks the line between protest and unlawful conduct.

Signal, Phone Security, and OpSec

• Consensus that Signal’s crypto is intact; the real risks are:
  • Phones seized and unlocked (forensic tools, zero-days, or coercion).
  • Undercover agents, informants, and journalists in large, loosely vetted groups.
  • Screenshots leaked from inside chats, not protocol compromise.
• Disagreement over how dangerous Signal’s phone-number requirement is; critics see it as a key identifier, defenders note usernames, contact-discovery protections, and minimal server-side metadata.
• Alternatives (Briar, Session, Threema, SimpleX) are discussed, but each has tradeoffs (forward secrecy, DoS, platform support).

Surveillance Tech, Palantir, and State Power

• Several see Palantir and similar tools as overhyped but still dangerous: they aggregate many data sources, enabling targeting and “parallel construction,” even if the analysis is clumsy.
• Others emphasize incompetence: ICE’s apparent misidentifications and chaotic raids suggest crude use of data, but that doesn’t lessen harm.

Violence, 2nd Amendment, and Escalation

• A small minority explicitly suggests armed resistance against ICE; most strongly reject this as both morally wrong and exactly what authorities might want to justify a harsher crackdown.
• Long back-and-forth about whether the 2nd Amendment ever realistically enabled resisting tyranny, with references to asymmetric warfare, modern state firepower, and partisan hypocrisy.

Politics, Fascism Analogies, and International Views

• Many participants describe the administration’s behavior—extrajudicial killings, selective enforcement, labeling opponents “terrorists”—as overtly authoritarian or fascist.
• Comparison is made to historical COINTELPRO and foreign secret-police tactics; some note that earlier abuses didn’t include public, uninvestigated shootings of citizens.
• A commenter from Europe says the events, and official lying despite video evidence, resemble early-stage fascism and have damaged US credibility abroad.

Tactics, Strategy, and Movement Security

• Practical advice recurs: small, vetted groups; rotating group chats; disappearing messages; no phones (or hardened phones) at actions; assume any large open chat is compromised.
• Others stress that over-focusing on tech and “perfect opsec” can induce paralysis; they argue mass, visible, lawful protest and electoral work remain the most scalable levers for change.