Tesla ending Models S and X production

Discontinuing S/X and Tesla’s Product Strategy

  • Many see ending the aging, low-volume S and X as rational: frees engineering and factory capacity for higher-volume 3/Y and new bets (robotaxis, Optimus).
  • Others argue killing the “flagship” halo cars is unusual; legacy automakers keep premium/luxury lines even at low volume to showcase tech and brand aspiration.
  • Some say S/X had become uncompetitive: old platforms, stale styling, expensive to refresh, and cannibalized by cheaper 3/Y with similar performance.
  • A minority thinks the move will chill used and new S/X demand: who wants a freshly discontinued, software-heavy model with uncertain long-term parts support?

Competition, Commoditization, and Missed Segments

  • Several threads argue EVs are now a commodity. Tesla’s original battery/EV lead has shrunk; Chinese and European makers now offer cheaper or better options, especially in Europe.
  • Commenters repeatedly mention Chinese EVs (especially BYD) and European compacts (e.g. new small EVs) as eating into Tesla’s share, with tariffs temporarily shielding Tesla in the US.
  • Some think Tesla’s biggest strategic miss is not releasing a smaller, cheaper “Model 2”-type car, especially for Europe, while pouring money into Cybertruck and robots.

Cybertruck and Other Programs

  • Cybertruck widely characterized as a flop relative to its own hype: far below original volume, price, and range promises; capacity built for hundreds of thousands vs. sales estimated in the tens of thousands.
  • A few defend it as a deliberate low-volume tech testbed (48V, new architecture) rather than a mainstream product; most point to undisclosed sales and reduced battery orders as red flags.
  • Semi and Roadster are repeatedly cited as languishing or effectively dead, undermining confidence in new product promises.

FSD, Robotaxis, and Optimus

  • Deep skepticism that converting Fremont for robot and robotaxi production is sane near-term: humanoid robots are not yet a real market, and many robots shown so far (Tesla’s included) are viewed as controlled demos.
  • Long-running frustration with FSD timelines: predictions of imminent full autonomy have slipped for nearly a decade; Tesla still officially delivers only Level 2 ADAS.
  • Some see recent FSD versions as genuinely impressive and believe vision-only autonomy will eventually work; others argue Tesla trails dedicated robotaxi operators that already run driverless fleets in multiple cities.
  • Optimus is seen by critics as “the new hype pillar” to justify valuation once FSD/robotaxis timelines lost credibility; supporters counter that if general-purpose humanoids arrive, demand could be enormous.

Financials, Valuation, and “Meme Stock” Dynamics

  • Multiple comments note falling profits, stagnant or declining unit growth, inventory build-up, and huge dependence on 3/Y, yet a market cap larger than most of the global auto industry combined.
  • Many describe Tesla as a meme stock driven by belief in future robots/AI rather than current car business fundamentals; some say shorting it is suicidal while the “cult” narrative holds.
  • Others argue Tesla must seek non-auto “trillion-dollar stories” (FSD, robots, energy) because a pure car-maker cannot support its current valuation.

Musk, Brand Damage, and Politics

  • Numerous commenters say they will never buy another Tesla solely because of Musk’s behavior and politics, and see brand collapse among core early EV adopters as a major driver of slowing demand.
  • Others insist focusing on the CEO’s persona blinds people to Tesla’s real technical and business achievements, but acknowledge his public actions have become a material business risk.

Broader Context

  • Some view Tesla as having successfully jump-started global EV adoption and charging infrastructure—mission partly accomplished—then squandering its first-mover advantage through overpromising, erratic pivots, and underinvestment in fresh, grounded car models.