Tesla is committing automotive suicide

Unproven bets: robotaxis and consumer robots

• Many see Tesla’s pivot away from high-end cars toward robotaxis and humanoid robots as a leap into two unproven or tiny markets (Waymo revenue cited as modest; home robots “absolute unknown”).
• Critics argue this can’t replace lost auto revenue and resembles chasing hype to sustain an inflated valuation rather than a grounded business transition.
• Supporters counter that EVs were also “impossible” once, and Musk’s strategy has always been to skate to where the puck is going, not where it is.

Feasibility of consumer and humanoid robots

• Multiple comments call consumer robotics an “engineering tar pit”: far more actuators, 3D interaction, messy/variable homes, pets, kids, fluids, and no standardized environment.
• Many doubt any near-term market for multi‑thousand‑dollar home robots that can’t match cheap human labor or full-service maids.
• Teleoperated robots are debated: some see them as dystopian labor arbitrage (“remote maids” in low‑wage countries), others as viable if one operator can supervise many robots and if customers are already comfortable with remote workers in their homes.
• Humanoid form factors are criticized as media‑friendly but impractical; the hard part is robust, dexterous manipulation, not walking.

Robotaxis, FSD, and competition

• Waymo is seen by many as clearly ahead in operational robotaxis; Tesla’s data advantage claims and decade of “FSD next year” promises are widely mocked.
• Some owners say current FSD on new hardware is “phenomenal” and safer than human driving; others call AP/FSD a dangerous gimmick, with unreliable vision-only parking and lane assist.
• Robotaxi economics are questioned: even at large scale, revenues may be too small to replace Tesla’s lost vehicle profits (“trading physical dollars for digital pennies”).
• A key concern: Tesla is not leading in either robotaxis or robotics yet must both prove the markets and beat incumbents.

Valuation, incentives, and Musk’s pay structure

• Many argue the stock trades on Musk’s narrative rather than results; Tesla is described as a “huge bubble” where bad news sometimes moves the price up.
• Musk’s compensation milestone of 10M FSD subscriptions is repeatedly cited as a possible driver of decisions like removing free lane-keeping/adaptive cruise and pushing paid FSD.
• Some speculate about gaming that metric (redefining FSD, ultra‑cheap subscriptions), and about the board’s willingness to bend criteria to keep Musk.

Competition: China and other automakers

• Consensus that Chinese makers, especially BYD, are beating Tesla on price and volume; tariffs are seen as the main thing shielding Western brands.
• Some insist BYD’s edge partly comes from abusive labor practices; others counter Tesla also has serious labor and safety issues and that Chinese firms have real technological prowess.
• Several say Tesla could compete as a “normal” car company with strong brand and tech but that would never justify its current valuation, forcing ever bigger “moonshots.”

Product strategy: models, features, and “suicide vs pruning”

• Dropping Model S/X is viewed by critics as abandoning profitable halo products and ceding the luxury segment; defenders say they are low-volume “tech debt” SKUs distracting from mass models (3/Y) and robotaxis.
• Some question why Tesla didn’t simply refresh S/X or build more conventional SUVs instead of chasing Cybercab and robots.
• Removal of basic lane-keep/adaptive cruise from new cars, while competitors include them as standard, is seen as deliberately crippling the product to funnel drivers into FSD subscriptions.
• Others argue car manufacturing is a low-margin, brutal business and refocusing on software/services/AI is rational if Tesla wants to avoid becoming “just another automaker.”

Musk’s track record and investor psychology

• Thread revisits a long list of overpromised or abandoned visions (cheap Model 3, Hyperloop, battery swapping, Earth‑to‑Earth rockets, X as “everything app”) alongside genuine successes (kickstarting EVs, reusable rockets, Starlink).
• Some see Musk as a visionary who has earned strategic deference; others see a con man propped up by a personality cult, with companies forced into increasingly extreme narratives (humanoid robots, space data centers) to justify valuations.
• Several wonder why shareholders tolerate this; answers include dependence on Musk’s “reality distortion field,” cult dynamics, and the hope of exiting before the music stops.

User experience and reliability

• Owner reports are mixed: some love their Teslas and see them as clearly superior to rivals; others describe janky UX, confusing door handles, degraded or broken features after software changes (e.g., Grok replacing working voice controls), and safety‑relevant vision regressions.
• External inspection and testing data from Europe are cited as showing high failure rates for some Tesla models; defenders say they’ll accept that if service remains good.
• Several observe that strong pro‑ and anti‑Musk emotions now heavily color any discussion of the company, making objective evaluation difficult.