221 Cannon is Not For Sale

Questions about the blog post itself

• Several commenters noticed errors/mismatches (email typo explanation, “hi good morning” vs “hi [name] good evening”) and speculated the post may have been polished or partially written with AI, leading to odd corrections.
• This fed some skepticism about factual precision, including whether the scammer’s claimed tactics (like profiting from earnest money) really align with how transactions work.

Nature of the land/title scam

• Common pattern described: scammer pretends to own a vacant lot (often owned by an out-of-town or overseas owner), lists it cheaply, pushes for fast, remote closing, then disappears once questioned.
• Some say the main goal is to grab earnest money before a full title search; others argue the real goal is the entire sale proceeds if they can get money wired before problems are noticed.
• A few are skeptical the “earnest money scam” is workable in practice, given escrow and title checks, and question whether scammers actually ever get paid.

Title systems and structural weaknesses

• US land records are highly decentralized (typically county level), with varied rigor in identity checks; this makes fraud feasible and cleanup costly even if rights ultimately prevail.
• Several commenters contrast this with Torrens-style registries or notary-based systems (Australia, Germany, Canada, some US states historically, Iowa’s state-backed title guarantee), which make the registry closer to a final source of truth but still not foolproof.
• There is disagreement over why the US lacks broad Torrens adoption: some blame title insurance industry lobbying; others emphasize federal/state structure and mixed historical experiences.

Title insurance and liens

• Title insurance usually protects buyers and lenders, primarily against defects existing at purchase; some “enhanced” products cover later issues but details vary.
• A fraudulent deed doesn’t change true ownership but can force expensive legal action to clear title.
• Proposed mitigations: keeping a mortgage or HELOC (bank as additional gatekeeper), registering for land-registry alert services (UK, some US/Canada jurisdictions), or even self-imposed liens.

Practical owner defenses for vacant land

• Suggestions include:
  • “This property is not for sale” signs (reported as effective in places like Kenya), though others note signs can be removed or bypassed via social engineering.
  • Proactively flagging the property with local authorities/registries where possible.
  • Regularly monitoring records and using official alert services where available.

Identity theft: frequency and framing

• Some push back on the blog’s “like most people” claim, saying they’ve never had identity theft; others argue that if you count credit card fraud or misuse of SSNs, “most people” in some countries have had some identity-related incident.
• One commenter calls “identity theft” a framing that shifts blame from financial institutions’ lax practices to individuals, suggesting this is just fraud by or against third parties.

Law enforcement and platforms

• Multiple anecdotes describe police and federal agencies (including the FBI) showing little interest in property fraud or burglary unless political or large-scale.
• Others note practical obstacles: many scammers operate from abroad, making prosecution unlikely.
• Separate but related: complaints that platforms like Facebook allow fraudulent property or rental listings to persist despite reports, creating risks for real owners.

Ethical and policy debates about land

• Some criticize long-term ownership of unused vacant land as socially harmful, arguing land should be used or heavily taxed if left idle.
• Others defend reasons for holding land (future retirement home, family inheritance, hunting, low-value parcels) and emphasize convenience vs protection trade-offs: more bureaucracy and identity checks reduce fraud but add friction.
• Underneath is a recurring tension: convenience-first digital systems create exploitable seams, but serious, human-in-the-loop verification is costly and politically unpopular.