Show HN: If you lose your memory, how to regain access to your computer?

Account recovery failures & distrust of big providers

• Several stories of being locked out of long‑held Google accounts despite correct passwords and backup codes; recovery prompts get stuck on unreachable devices or unsupported phone numbers.
• People warn that Google (and similar services) should be treated as a liability: use Takeout, don’t rely on their recovery, and keep independent backups.
• Apple’s ecosystem (iCloud, Apple ID lockouts, Legacy Contact not including Keychain) is seen as convenient but scary lock‑in; some export passwords periodically as a hedge.

Approaches to post‑memory / post‑death access

• OP’s tool: client‑side Shamir Secret Sharing, producing ZIP/PDF bundles that can be pre‑distributed to friends for “social recovery” if memory is lost.
• Alternatives:
  • Google Inactive Account Manager / dead‑man’s switches (or DIY via GitHub Actions).
  • Password managers with emergency access (Bitwarden, Vaultwarden; some share master passwords with partners).
  • Low‑tech: master password written in a journal or on paper, in a safe, safe‑deposit box, or with a lawyer, sometimes split across multiple people.

Threat models & philosophy

• Some explicitly want no recovery if they forget: “If you don’t know the password, you don’t need it,” preferring legal delegation (wills, POA) and separate access for others.
• Others focus on digital inheritance: ensuring family can reach banking, infrastructure, and self‑hosted services, not necessarily every private file.
• Debate over whether the bigger risk is memory loss vs friends’ betrayal; betrayal risk rises with the financial value of what’s protected.

Shamir Secret Sharing & technical concerns

• Shamir is repeatedly suggested as the “right” primitive (M‑of‑N access, information‑theoretic security), but commenters note it is easy to implement incorrectly and deserves standardization and real audits.
• Some suggest simpler schemes (multiple independent encryptions or Reed–Solomon‑style constructions) to avoid Shamir pitfalls.
• Threshold choices (e.g., 5‑of‑7) are questioned as too high given accidents, death, or people losing shards.

Physical storage & disaster reality

• Fireproof safes may fail in real house fires; water damage is often worse. Suggestions include: bank boxes (with caveats about theft, sealing after death, and banks phasing them out), floor safes, metal plates for engraving secrets, and redundancy across locations.
• People emphasize backups of everything that matters (from photos to playlists), not just passwords.

Human factors & future‑you

• Many note: passwords alone aren’t enough; heirs need a “map” and written instructions.
• There’s reflection on aging, TBI, long‑COVID, and memory “bitrot,” plus advice to write for “future you,” use notebooks/valet bowls, and run periodic “drills” to ensure any recovery plan actually works.
• A recurring joke/critique: “who even has five trusted friends?”—the social assumption behind N‑of‑M schemes may not fit everyone.