Online age-verification tools for child safety are surveilling adults
Status of age verification & laws
- Discord’s current age verification is described as optional and tied to specific features (NSFW servers, content filters), but reporters and some commenters inaccurately call it “mandatory.”
- Several note that new or pending laws (California, Texas, UK Online Safety Act, others) push toward making age verification legally mandatory across platforms, possibly even at OS level.
- Some EU commenters highlight the planned EUDI wallet for selective age proofs, but others point to significant privacy and unlinkability concerns in its design.
Child safety vs. actual effectiveness
- Many argue the systems won’t stop determined predators or older teens; bad actors can simply avoid verification, use stolen/borrowed IDs, or buy access.
- Blocking “unverified” accounts from communication (e.g., Roblox) is seen as more effective than ID collection, but still imperfect.
- Several see the main effect as restricting kids’ social media use and communication with peers, not protecting them from real-world harms.
Privacy, data security, and surveillance
- Strong concern that age checks inherently require identity checks, creating massive PII honeypots vulnerable to leaks, abuse, and resale.
- Existing regulatory protections (FTC rules, HIPAA, PCI) are widely seen as ineffective; repeated data breaches and low fines are cited.
- Many believe the true goal is de-anonymizing adults and expanding state/corporate surveillance, using “protect the children” as cover.
Technical and economic impacts
- Fear that small developers and FOSS projects can’t afford compliance and will be pushed out, consolidating power in big platforms (Google, Meta, etc.).
- Discussion of probabilistic age inference (behavioral signals, account/device age) vs. deterministic ID checks; the former is seen as less invasive but not legally satisfying.
Alternatives and mitigations
- Suggested alternatives: device-level parental controls and ratings headers, anonymous age tokens bought in cash, credit-card-based checks where cards already on file, and zero-knowledge proof systems.
- Others advocate holding platforms liable for unsupervised contact with minors instead of universal ID, plus better digital education for children.
User reactions and resistance
- Some plan to refuse verification, close accounts, forge data, or retreat to VPNs, underground networks, and decentralized systems.
- Others argue anonymity is already mostly gone and see outrage as belated or futile, which critics counter by insisting meaningful privacy is still possible and worth defending.