North Korean's 100k fake IT workers net $500M a year for Kim

Meaning of “fake workers”

• Many question calling them “fake” since they are real people doing real IT work.
• Clarifications in thread: “fake” refers to use of stolen identities, falsified paperwork, misrepresented location, and intent to evade sanctions and labor laws.
• Others suggest better terms: fraudulent, deceptive, spies, foreign agents, bonded labor, or even “advanced persistent coworker/telecommuter.”
• Some see them primarily as potential insider threats, planted to exfiltrate data or gain privileged access over time.

Economic scale and math

• Headline implies ~$5,000/year per worker ($500M / 100k), which several find low.
• Explanations offered: churn from getting caught and fired; overhead for U.S. “fronts” and proxies; multiple support staff per “front” worker; inclusion of lower-revenue overseas labor (timber, restaurants, mercenaries).
• Others note that even this amount is large in North Korean terms and that the regime likely captures most of it.

Working conditions and “slavery” debate

• Some compare this to bonded labor or slavery because most earnings go to the state and workers likely cannot refuse.
• Others push back, distinguishing this from wage labor in liberal economies, emphasizing that Western employees can legally quit and leave.
• A separate “wage slavery vs. real slavery” debate ensues, with disagreement over whether economic dependence equals slavery.

Security, legality, and hiring practices

• Discussion that the work is highly illegal under U.S. law (sanctions, false identities), though North Korea ignores U.S. jurisdiction.
• Participants highlight bigger risk than lost wages: temporary access to internal systems, source code, and sensitive data.
• Some argue companies should insist on in-person verification; others counter this can be faked with stand-ins and deepfakes.
• Reports of scams: fronts using real U.S./EU identities, home proxy servers, laptop “farms,” and offers to “rent” résumés or have locals front client communications.

Anecdotes and detection

• Interviewers report candidates with inconsistent identities, weak spoken English despite claimed Western degrees, and obvious off-screen coding assistance.
• Some recruiters say they’ve built heuristics to spot likely North Korean applicants and have seen calls abruptly terminated when challenged.
• Suggested “litmus tests” (e.g., asking about Kim Jong Un inappropriately) are viewed as unreliable long term.