Xiaomi launches next-gen SU7 with 902 km range and Lidar, still undercuts Tesla

Lidar, sensors, and Tesla comparison

  • Commenters note Xiaomi prominently advertising Lidar, framed as an “upgrade” over Tesla’s camera‑only approach.
  • Some argue Tesla boxed itself in with its no‑Lidar stance driven by leadership ego.
  • Others joke that even cheap consumer devices (robot vacuums) use basic Lidar, underscoring how the tech is now commonplace.

Range claims, test cycles, and real‑world performance

  • The 902 km figure is from China’s CLTC cycle, widely viewed as optimistic.
  • Prior SU7 with 830 km CLTC reportedly achieves ~60–80% of that in practice depending on conditions.
  • Estimates for the new model’s real‑world range cluster around 300–400 miles, still seen as strong but “not game changing” on range alone.
  • Some note US EPA ranges are also optimistic; several Tesla owners report ~60–75% of rated range in harsh or fast‑driving conditions.
  • Debate over what advertised range should represent; suggestions include using mean real‑world values or publishing full distributions.

Charging speeds and usability

  • Xiaomi’s claimed 10–80% in ~11 minutes (5C) is seen as potentially “game changing” if real, because short top‑ups every ~250–300 real miles would greatly reduce trip friction.
  • Others emphasize this is only a manufacturer claim until independently tested.
  • Discussion highlights that fast charging from 80–100% is usually the hard part; BYD is cited as pushing that frontier.

EV economics and ICE viability

  • One side argues EVs are a “political fantasy” with expensive electricity, weak infrastructure, and limited environmental upside.
  • Multiple EV owners counter with much lower per‑mile energy costs, time savings from home charging, and carbon break‑even after relatively low mileage.
  • Highway charging infrastructure in parts of Europe is described as now robust enough for long trips without anxiety.

Chinese vs Western automakers, tariffs, and competition

  • Some Americans favor temporary tariffs or bans on Chinese EVs to give domestic firms time to catch up; others see this as harmful protectionism that props up inefficient incumbents.
  • Several argue consumers should welcome subsidized Chinese EVs as they deliver better price/performance, even if that pressures US and EU automakers.
  • Others worry about capital flight and loss of domestic industrial capability if foreign brands dominate, especially in a “very large” sector like autos.

Subsidies, costs, and Chinese industrial structure

  • Thread agrees Chinese EV makers are subsidized, but some say per‑vehicle subsidies are smaller than for US EVs; the key advantage is structural: vertically integrated supply chains and cheap state credit.
  • Comparisons are drawn to US and European subsidies, bailouts, and tax credits for their own automakers.
  • Detailed comments describe how Chinese local and central governments rely heavily on corporate profits (including SOEs) rather than household income taxes, creating strong alignment between state and industry and enabling persistent support (e.g., roll‑over loans, below‑inflation interest).
  • Critics argue this model can reduce efficiency and labor productivity, citing steel industry productivity comparisons, while others note high‑productivity Asian examples exist as counterpoints.

Chinese EV market presence and quality concerns

  • In Europe, some say Chinese brands remain niche; others cite data and street observations showing rapid growth toward ~10% market share, especially for BYD, MG, Geely and some PHEVs.
  • Several foresee intense pressure on European makers as Chinese brands combine rapid innovation, lower prices, and competitive quality.
  • Others caution that apparent value may be offset by long‑term issues like rust protection and material thickness, suggesting waiting 5–10 years of fleet aging before judging durability.

US auto industry, protectionism, and foreign production

  • Some propose allowing Chinese EVs if they build in the US/Mexico/Canada, possibly via joint ventures with US firms.
  • Counterpoints: low labor cost is now less decisive due to automation; regulatory and safety requirements and lost Chinese subsidies would likely raise prices.
  • There is disagreement on whether preserving US auto companies (vs just US auto jobs) is important; some care mainly about workers, not domestic brand ownership.
  • Others emphasize that profits from manufacturing staying with US firms matters for national wealth and resilience.

Charging infrastructure and real‑world adoption

  • Mixed views on infrastructure: some claim grids and chargers are inadequate; others, especially in Europe and the Nordics, report dense fast‑charger networks (Tesla, Ionity, Fastned, oil‑company sites) and low‑stress long‑distance EV travel.
  • Nighttime smart charging is cited as a way to manage grid demand that has, in at least one country, fallen from past peaks.

Standards, metrics, and testing bias

  • Strong warnings not to compare CLTC numbers directly with EPA or WLTP.
  • Some share third‑party testing (e.g., automotive associations) showing wide variation in how close different brands get to rated range; disagreements emerge on whether certain organizations are biased toward domestic manufacturers.
  • One commenter suggests automakers could use real‑fleet telemetry (e.g., from connected cars) to publish more realistic range metrics.

Subsidies and consumer perspective

  • Several note that from a non‑Chinese consumer’s point of view, Chinese subsidies are effectively “free money” in the form of cheaper cars.
  • Analogy to VC‑backed startups selling at a loss: rational consumers should exploit underpriced products while they last.

Open questions and uncertainties

  • Exact battery capacity and precise efficiency figures for the new SU7 variant remain unclear in the thread; multiple people ask but no concrete numbers are provided.
  • Real‑world validation of Xiaomi’s charging claims and long‑term reliability of Chinese EVs are flagged as key unknowns.