Cyberattack on vehicle breathalyzer company leaves drivers stranded in the US
A ransomware attack against Intoxalock, a major U.S. provider of court‑mandated in‑car breathalyzers for DUI offenders, has temporarily prevented required device calibrations and left many drivers unable to start their vehicles. Commenters use the outage to probe deeper issues: the reliance on private vendors to administer criminal penalties, the financial burden and safety risks imposed on largely poor defendants, the broader car‑dependent urban design that makes loss of driving quasi‑existential, and whether safety‑critical software and legal tech should face stricter engineering standards, liability, and regulation.
Criminal Justice, Punishment, and Profit
- Many argue the US system is structurally punitive: interlocks are court‑mandated, expensive, and imposed via plea deals that can include conditions beyond normal sentencing.
- Critiques focus on poor defendants coerced into revenue‑generating arrangements for courts and private vendors (interlocks, classes, monitoring), with little public concern.
- Others counter that DUI penalties are relatively lenient (e.g., short interlock durations, multiple DUIs before long mandates) and that people who endanger others “shouldn’t be driving.”
Interlocks vs. License Suspension
- Supporters: interlocks are more effective than suspensions, since many people drive on suspended licenses anyway; they prevent drunk starts without entirely removing mobility needed for work.
- Critics: devices are unreliable, dangerous (requiring blows while driving or rapid pull‑overs), and exist mainly to extract money; some advocate permanent driving bans after a DUI instead.
- There is debate over whether such measures constitute reasonable punishment or excessive, ad‑hoc burdens layered on top of sentences.
Car Dependence and Public Transit
- Strong theme: US land‑use and transit policy makes driving effectively mandatory; losing a car can mean losing job and housing.
- Comparisons to other countries highlight that car‑free living and non‑car commutes are feasible elsewhere but often impractical or impossible in much of the US.
Nature of the Cyberattack
- Clarifications: vehicles were not remotely bricked.
- Interlocks lock out cars if periodic in‑person “calibration” is missed; service centers doing calibrations were ransomwared, so many devices timed out and stranded drivers.
Software Liability and Regulation
- Some call for “software building codes” or mandatory standards for safety‑critical systems, with testing, warranties, and penalties when failures strand thousands.
- Others argue regulation should target specific safety‑critical domains (cars, planes, medical devices) rather than all software and warn about bureaucracy and unclear responsibility.
Drunk Driving Policy and Technology
- Discussion of future passive impairment detection: camera‑based monitoring, lane‑keeping data, OEM‑integrated systems mandated by law, but current tech seen as immature and potentially flaky.
- Concerns about government or OEM kill switches and aftermarket bypass devices; proposals include encrypted vehicle networks and criminalizing dummy interlocks.
Alcohol, BAC Limits, and Behavior
- Explanations for drunk driving: addiction, poor decision‑making while intoxicated, car‑centric layouts, cheap high‑proof alcohol.
- Debate over BAC thresholds (0.08 vs 0.05), individual variability in impairment, and the trade‑off between clear legal standards and scientific nuance.