The EU still wants to scan your private messages and photos

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

What is being voted on

  • Discussion centers on “Chat Control” and Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, which currently allows “voluntary” scanning of private communications for CSAM.
  • This vote is about extending that temporary regime; some note recent amendments that:
    • Extend it to 2027.
    • Require scanning to be targeted and warrant-based.
    • Exclude end-to-end encrypted (E2E) communications.
  • Others argue that “voluntary” mass scanning is already a serious rights violation and that the campaign site blurs the line between voluntary and mandatory regimes.

EU structure and who is pushing it

  • Several comments stress it is not “the EU” generically but:
    • The European Commission (appointed, proposes laws).
    • Member state governments in the Council.
    • The EPP conservative group driving this specific re-vote.
  • Counterpoint: previous iterations were also pushed by social democrats; support is cross-party and establishment‑driven, not purely “right-wing”.
  • Distinction emphasized between:
    • Council = member states / governments.
    • Parliament = directly elected MEPs; more privacy‑protective so far.

Rights, law, and surveillance

  • Multiple references to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (privacy, data protection) and national “secrecy of correspondence” provisions.
  • Some argue these charters do matter and have been used by courts to strike down surveillance laws; others say rights are riddled with “except as limited by law” loopholes and thus weak in practice.
  • Long subthread on whether rights can or should be “absolute,” especially privacy vs. national security / public safety.

Democracy, repetition, and lobbying

  • Strong frustration that rejected proposals keep returning until they pass; compared to “nagging” and dark patterns.
  • Some advocate for rules imposing cooling‑off periods after repeated rejections; others say such rules would be gamed and block legitimate improvements.
  • Widespread belief that lobbying (including tech firms and law‑enforcement interests) is a key driver.

Technical and practical aspects

  • Client-side scanning and potential OS‑level integration are seen as particularly dangerous, leaving ordinary users exposed while serious criminals route around it.
  • Suggestions: use strong E2E tools, self‑hosted services, privacy‑focused phones/OSes; but many note this won’t help the general population.

Current status (unclear)

  • One comment claims the extension passed with strong safeguards (targeted, warrant‑based).
  • Another claims the repeat vote was rejected by a one‑vote margin (307–306).
  • The exact outcome in the thread is inconsistent and marked here as unclear.