Internet Protocol Version 8 (IPv8)

Overall reaction

  • Majority view the IPv8 draft as unserious, unworkable, or “speculative fiction”; several call it dead on arrival.
  • A few find it intellectually interesting as a thought experiment, or as “what IPv6 addressing could have been,” but still reject the full design.

Backward compatibility and transition claims

  • Draft claims IPv4 is a proper subset of IPv8 and that no devices or applications must change.
  • Multiple commenters argue this is impossible: version field and header length differ, so existing IPv4 stacks, routers, NICs, and firewalls will drop or misparse IPv8 packets.
  • The spec also introduces new APIs (AF_INET8), DNS records (A8), ARP8, ICMPv8, routing protocols, and firmware requirements, contradicting “no modification required.”

Security, surveillance, and OAuth/JWT

  • Strong concern that “OAuth2/JWT on every manageable element/packet” bakes authentication and identity into L3.
  • Many see this as inherently censorship- and surveillance-friendly, enabling tracking of every connection and killing anonymity and peer-to-peer use.
  • Several note the bootstrap problem: you need network access to obtain a token, but the network requires a token. Details on trust, protection scope, and mechanics are described as vague or circular.

Addressing model vs IPv4/IPv6

  • IPv8 proposes 64-bit addresses, presented as more “human friendly” with dotted decimals.
  • Some like “more dots” over IPv6’s hex format; others say memorability is a non-issue and DNS should be used anyway.
  • Critics argue this offers IPv6’s migration and complexity problems with fewer benefits, and doesn’t solve mobile/roaming challenges.

Routing, ASNs, and architecture

  • IPv8 ties routing directly to ASNs and hands each ASN a fixed block; routing table bounded at one entry per ASN.
  • Commenters say this conflates identity and location, breaks current multihoming and provider-change patterns, and would require orders of magnitude more ASNs.
  • “Cross-AS Cost Factor” is criticized for assuming inter-operator trust in shared metrics, contrary to why BGP is policy-based today.

Centralization and operational model

  • Mandated “Zone Servers” bundle DNS, DHCP, NTP, auth, telemetry, ACLs, etc., on fixed addresses, seen as a dangerous single point of failure and control.
  • East–west isolation and forced cloud-mediated access (e.g., for printers or file shares) are mocked as impractical and overly cloud-centric.

Meta-discussion

  • Several note that anyone can publish an Internet-Draft and this one currently has no IETF standing.
  • Some speculate it may be AI-assisted or “vibe-written,” pointing to buzzword-heavy sections and lack of concrete mechanisms.