New Referendum Would Flip Brexit Result 10 Years On, Poll Finds

Economic impacts of Brexit

• Linked analysis cited: UK GDP estimated 6–8% lower, business investment ~12% lower, trade volume ~15% lower than a “remain” counterfactual; some argue this matches pre‑2016 expert forecasts.
• Specific sector example: UK car production said to have fallen from ~2M to ~750k per year, with investment “plummeting.”
• Critics note the UK had an unusually favorable EU deal (influence over rules plus opt‑outs); leaving reduced economic power without clear offsetting gains.
• Skeptics argue economists can’t know the counterfactual and claim the UK is doing “fine,” that dire predictions did not materialize, and that remaining might not have been better.

Polls, referendums, and democratic thresholds

• Debate over pre‑Brexit polling: some recall a predicted Remain win; others point out polls were very tight.
• Several argue such a far‑reaching constitutional change should have required a supermajority and/or turnout quorum; the 2016 vote being 50%+1 is seen as problematic.
• Comparison with the 1975 referendum to stay in the European Communities, which had a roughly two‑thirds “yes” vote.

Immigration, identity, and xenophobia

• Large subthread: whether national identity is ethnic (e.g., “Japan must have ethnic Japanese to be Japan”) vs cultural/behavioral and historically mixed.
• Some frame Brexit and rising Reform support as driven by xenophobia and racialized ideas of “connection to the land.”
• Others argue every country has the right to set immigration levels according to its own preferences and social trust.
• On economics, multiple comments insist immigrants are a net positive; detractors say “not all immigrants” and cite examples (e.g., elderly dependents) or data from Denmark and the Netherlands suggesting some groups are net fiscal costs.
• There is pushback that such data ignore structural discrimination and limited opportunities.

Domestic politics and party dynamics

• Some see a pattern of voters swinging between parties (“things are bad under C, try L, then R”) rather than ideology-driven choices.
• Reform is discussed as potentially gaining power under first‑past‑the‑post with a minority vote share; concern that Brexit referendum’s binary nature is not comparable.
• Harsh criticism of past Conservative governments (including very short‑lived premierships), and of campaign “lies” about redirecting EU contributions to the NHS.
• A minority blame the post‑Brexit situation primarily on Labour governance.

EU perspective on possible UK re‑entry

• Some fear that if the UK rejoined, a future anti‑EU government (e.g., Reform) could disrupt the Union from within, similar to other illiberal members.
• Others think a successful rejoin referendum might weaken hard‑Brexit parties.
• Pro‑EU commenters support deeper integration but also call the EU “dysfunctional and toothless” and want significant internal reform, though concrete proposals are mostly unspecified.
• There is concern the EU will now demand stronger guarantees and be wary of UK instability.

Confounding factors and wider context

• Several stress that COVID and global conflicts heavily affected the UK economy and public services, complicating attribution of all problems to Brexit.
• Counterpoint: while shocks were global, comparative data and sector‑specific declines suggest Brexit still imposed meaningful extra costs.
• Related note: recent UK plans to cut health and education capital spending to boost defense are cited as evidence of domestic strain and difficult trade‑offs.