Never Give Them Your Face

Scope of concern: age verification vs. identity harvesting

• Many commenters agree with the article’s core claim: most “age verification” schemes are effectively identity verification and long‑term tracking.
• Repeated worry: biometric databases enable future authoritarian misuse; faces and immutable traits are bad “passwords.”
• Some note that the rhetoric is “think of the children,” but the practical outcome is adult de‑anonymization and broader control of online speech.

Laws, lobbying, and coordination

• California is cited as a partial counter‑model: “age assurance” via device prompts is legal, while some forms of age verification are claimed to be illegal (details and coverage for websites are described as incomplete and future‑dated).
• Multiple countries pushing similar laws at once is widely viewed as coordinated, not organic; lobbyists and industry groups are said to draft and replicate bills.
• Meta is frequently named as a driving force, allegedly lobbying to push liability and age checks onto OS/app‑store layers while preserving its own ad‑targeting advantage.
• Others argue this is also a genuine moral panic about kids and social media harms that predates Meta’s current lobbying.

Technical alternatives and their limits

• Proposed alternatives:
  • Zero‑knowledge age proofs / digital credentials that reveal only “over 18.”
  • Hardware tokens (YubiKey‑style) or government‑signed anonymous age QR codes.
  • Device‑level “parent mode” with government or third‑party content lists.
• Critics note serious weaknesses: tokens can be shared or resold; without tying to real identity and legal liability, enforcement is weak.
• There is disagreement over whether truly privacy‑preserving age verification is technically and socially feasible at scale.

Surveillance reality vs. resistance

• Many argue “they already have your face”: passports, DMVs, airports, CCTVs, retailers, social media, banks, and ID vendors already collect it.
• Others counter that new generations, additional databases, and cross‑linking still matter; resistance (refusing scans, using Tor, alternative services) is seen as important even if incomplete.
• Some share practical tactics (e.g., opting out of TSA scanners, using virtual cameras or deepfakes to fool checks), but note that most people comply for convenience.

Public attitudes, defeatism, and strategy

• A visible split:
  • One camp: battle is already lost; people will trade privacy for convenience; petitions and boycotts won’t move platforms.
  • Another camp: defeatist talk itself helps enshittification; individuals should refuse services, support legal challenges (e.g., EFF), and push for stronger privacy laws.
• Several emphasize that only regulation and structural changes (e.g., limiting corporate governance abuses, banning broad biometrics) can ultimately constrain these systems.

Meta‑discussion about AI‑generated content

• Many believe the article itself is LLM‑generated and complain that AI “slop” dilutes otherwise valid arguments.
• Others caution against over‑zealous AI accusations, noting that some stylistic “tells” are also common human writing patterns.