The 'papers, please' era of the internet will decimate your privacy

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Governments in the US, Europe and Australia are moving toward mandatory age and identity checks for accessing large parts of the internet, framed as protecting children from social media, porn and online harms. Commenters warn this would effectively end anonymous speech, expand surveillance, centralize highly sensitive ID data and create powerful tools for censorship and political repression, while doing little to stop determined minors or foreign influence campaigns. Some point to cryptographic or parental-control alternatives, but many argue the real goal is broader identity control online rather than child safety.

Libraries, offline spaces, and privacy

  • Debate over whether “going to the library” is actually private or rebellious: some libraries require ID and track loans; others minimize logs, offer short video retention, and even MAC-hashing schemes for Wi‑Fi.
  • Several note you can still read on-premise anonymously, but public PCs and Wi‑Fi are usually tied to a card and ToS, so not great for online anonymity.
  • Concern that even libraries are being pulled into ID ecosystems (e.g., passports, voting services), though others doubt libraries themselves will be outlawed.

Anonymity, free speech, and accountability

  • One camp defends anonymous speech as core to free expression and political dissent; cites historical anonymous writing and US legal doctrine.
  • Opponents argue modern tech and mass foreign interference change the calculus; want ID for posting so people can judge credibility and reduce troll farms and bots.
  • Counter‑argument: most dangerous misinformation is not anonymous, and real‑ID systems primarily empower governments and corporations to punish speech.

Age verification, children, and parental responsibility

  • “Protect the children” is widely seen as the political framing; many argue it’s a pretext to end adult anonymity and expand surveillance.
  • Strong disagreement over where responsibility lies:
    • Some say parents alone should control kids’ devices and use built‑in parental controls; regulate devices/content labels, not identity.
    • Others respond that many parents are unwilling or unable to manage this, and society already limits kids’ access to alcohol, gambling, etc.
    • A minority argues social media access for minors should be treated as serious neglect, with legal consequences for parents, not everyone.

Technical proposals vs. inherent tradeoffs

  • Various designs discussed: anonymous credentials, ZK proofs, hardware‑locked tokens, lottery‑style scratch codes, device‑tied attestations, government digital IDs.
  • Critics say all “private age checks” fail in practice:
    • Tokens can be resold, proxied, or minted en masse (e.g., via compromised or incentivized devices).
    • To meaningfully stop this, schemes drift toward persistent, traceable identifiers and trusted computing, undermining privacy and open computing.
  • Several note governments and big platforms are incentivized to choose non‑private designs anyway, because they want deanonymization, enforcement ease, and better ad attribution.

Government, corporate incentives, and surveillance

  • Many see age‑verification and VPN restrictions as steps toward a unified “ID passport” / social‑credit‑like infrastructure: ISP sign‑ups, utilities, renting, work all stitched together.
  • Widespread suspicion that “protecting kids” masks goals of:
    • Identifying every speaker for censorship and retaliation.
    • Improving ad targeting and platform lock‑in.
    • Making laws against speech and downloading enforceable at individual scale.
  • Others suggest a regulated, open, state‑run identity layer could reduce fraud and bot activity, but opponents cite data‑breach risks and abuse by future governments.

Social media harms and proposed cures

  • Broad agreement that the current social media environment is harmful: addiction, polarization, AI‑generated propaganda, parasocial “brain‑rot,” manipulation of elections.
  • Disagreement on remedies:
    • Some want to “kill social media” or strip anonymity to fight bots and foreign influence.
    • Others prefer structural fixes: remove algorithmic safe harbors, require content tags/ratings, empower parents, or build better non‑commercial spaces.
  • Skepticism that real‑name regimes would actually fix these harms, given that major figures openly spread misinformation under their real identities.

Fate of privacy and the future internet

  • Many assert online privacy is already severely eroded (NSA, data brokers, ID‑SIM rules, pervasive tracking), so new mandates will make things strictly worse, not status quo.
  • Some plan to “opt out”: retreat to physical media, libraries, cash, air‑gapped machines, LAN parties/sneakernets; expect a clear split between a locked‑down “commercial” net and a shrinking open one.
  • Others predict that most people will comply; Tor/VPN alternatives will remain niche unless wrapped in easy, profitable services.
  • Underlying tension: whether remote privacy is a new, fragile anomaly we should expect to lose, or a vital right worth actively defending even against democratic governments.