Signal v7.0.0 with phone number privacy
Signal’s upcoming 7.0 release introduces a phone number privacy option and stops automatically notifying your contacts that you’re on Signal, renewing debate over how tightly secure messengers should be tied to phone numbers. Commenters weigh the trade-offs between privacy and abuse prevention, comparing Signal’s metadata protections and centralization to alternatives like Matrix, Session, and WhatsApp. There is also frustration around practical issues such as lack of robust iOS backups, large desktop client updates, and how securely (or not) Signal data is stored on desktop systems.
Phone number privacy & v7.0 changes
- Git history for v7.0 shows:
- A new “Phone Number Privacy” (PNP) setting to hide your number.
- An option to stop auto-notifying your contacts that you’re on Signal.
- Some see this as positive but insufficient; the core complaint (phone number as required ID) remains.
Phone numbers as identifiers
- Several commenters want registration without phone numbers, or at least alternative IDs, citing:
- Loss of accounts when numbers lapse.
- Difficulty maintaining multiple identities.
- Phone numbers being akin to legacy “universal IDs” (e.g., SSN in the 90s).
- A GNU/Linux phone user notes they must still tether Signal to a “real” phone.
- Others argue that if you really need anonymity, you can register via a burner / public phone, with inconvenience being the main downside.
Spam, abuse, and registration costs
- One view: phone numbers are used as a “cheap” anti-spam tool and possibly for government metadata demands.
- Counterview: Signal has publicly stated they use SMS verification to prevent spam signups, and that’s the primary reason.
- Thread cites Signal’s own claim of high SMS/voice verification costs (~$6M/year, via Twilio).
- Some users report recent crypto-scam spam messages from “numberless” Signal accounts; linkage to the beta is disputed and unclear.
Metadata, threat models, and AWS
- Debate over how private Signal really is:
- Pro-Signal side: sealed sender means servers don’t know who is messaging whom; published legal docs say Signal stores only registration time and last-connection time.
- Skeptical side: AWS and other network operators can still do traffic analysis based on IPs/timing; sealed sender doesn’t stop sophisticated metadata reconstruction.
- Comparison with Matrix:
- Matrix homeservers generally have explicit message/relationship data in their DBs; you can self-host, but then trust shifts to that server.
- Signal uses a single logical service, making it a bigger target but with a different metadata model.
- Consensus: Signal and Matrix address different threat models; neither is a perfect replacement for the other.
Backups, history, and local security
- Many iOS users want proper, encrypted backups to avoid losing all history if a phone dies; others want easy exports.
- Opposing view: simple export/backup tools are high-risk for abuse; Signal is for private, not archival, communication.
- Android already supports encrypted backups (even scheduled), but people complain about full vs incremental backups and storage overhead.
- Signal Desktop stores messages in a local SQLite DB with the decryption key in a nearby config file; this surprises some, who note that once data is plaintext on a device, OS-level compromise can expose it.
- Users also want:
- Per-device auto-delete of local history, independent of group settings.
- Admin tools to bulk-purge old group history.
- Smaller and less frequent desktop client updates.