The EU Wants Its Own DNS Resolver That Can Block 'Unlawful' Traffic,TorrentFreak

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

The EU’s plan to create its own DNS resolver that can block “unlawful” domains is raising concerns about censorship, digital sovereignty, and technical feasibility. Supporters see a government-run resolver as a way to reduce reliance on US-based services and centralize malware and court-ordered blocking, especially for public sector networks. Critics warn it could evolve from an optional service into a de facto mandatory, censored infrastructure—comparable to a “Great Firewall of Europe”—and note that users can often bypass DNS blocking via alternative resolvers, DoH, or VPNs.

Perceived Purpose and Motivation

  • EU wants its own DNS resolver partly because major public resolvers (Google, Cloudflare, etc.) are US-based.
  • Supporters frame it as digital sovereignty and a way to centralize blocking of clearly unlawful or malicious domains, relieving ISPs and providing a standard for public institutions.
  • Official documentation (via DNS4EU) emphasizes optional use, ability to comply with court orders, and use in government networks and telcos.

Concerns About Censorship and Mandates

  • Many see it as an infrastructure foothold for future censorship: starting as “optional,” then “recommended,” then effectively mandatory via regulation, funding conditions, or blocking of other DNS servers.
  • Fears of a “Great Firewall of Europe” surface, especially combined with other EU initiatives (eIDAS / EU TLS roots, scanning E2E chats).
  • Several worry about mission creep: from malware/trojans to torrent sites, copyright enforcement, foreign media, and broader “illegal content.”

Technical Feasibility and Workarounds

  • Some argue this is mostly symbolic or toothless: tech-savvy users can switch resolvers, use DoH/DoT, VPNs, or hosts files.
  • Others note governments/ISPs could block non‑EU DNS IPs, DNS over port 53, or mandate browser/OS use of specific DoH endpoints, at least for non‑experts.
  • Blocking DoH at scale is seen as technically possible if backed by law, but politically challenging and slow.

Human Rights, Privacy, and Legal Dimensions

  • One line of argument links forced DNS use to privacy violations and unequal treatment under law, potentially triggering challenges under European human-rights frameworks.
  • Some see state DNS control as preferable to opaque private or foreign control; others view any state DNS filtering as inherently dystopian.

Examples and Precedents

  • DNS-based blocking (e.g., of RT) is cited as already happening via ISPs; debate centers on whether this is legitimate counter‑propaganda during war or straightforward censorship.
  • Comparisons are drawn with Turkey’s DNS blocking, China’s Great Firewall, and US domain seizures; some see convergence with practices the EU has historically criticized.

Practical Value vs. Risk

  • Critics question user demand: most people don’t explicitly want their DNS to stop them visiting torrent or controversial sites.
  • Proponents argue that standardized, state-run DNS with malware blocking could improve security and compliance for ISPs, companies, and public Wi‑Fi, while noting that serious censorship can still be routed around.