The unstallable plane that stalled

Life jackets, buoyancy, and water egress

• Several comments argue life jackets inside a small floatplane cabin can be dangerous: inflated vests hinder escape through submerged exits, snag on seats/belts, and pin people to the cabin roof.
• The Ethiopian 961 ditching is cited as an example where inflating jackets inside led to drowning, which is why modern briefings say to inflate only after exiting.
• Discussion distinguishes “life jackets” vs “buoyancy aids” (terminology varies US/UK):
  • Lifejackets: designed to turn you face‑up, can be foam, inflatable, or hybrid.
  • Buoyancy aids: constant foam, more mobility but often won’t turn you face‑up if unconscious.
• The article’s mention of “approved life jackets” is interpreted as non‑auto‑inflating designs that don’t impede underwater escape.

Stall behavior, modifications, and the “unstallable” myth

• Multiple commenters stress: every fixed‑wing aircraft can stall; calling any “unstallable” is seen as dangerously wrong.
• The Cessna 185 here had floats, cargo pack, STOL kit, and 3‑blade prop; some argue these are common bush mods, others note the specific combination’s stall behavior was poorly documented and had to be re‑flight‑tested.
• Concern that STOL mods and wing twist changed stall from root‑first to tip‑first, reducing natural buffet warning and promoting sudden wing drop or snap‑roll.
• Disagreement on whether the pilot’s reliance on trim vs active control was the key proximate cause; most agree overall airmanship and misunderstanding of stalls were central.

Pilot training, stall recovery, and low‑altitude margins

• Several pilots describe two training cultures:
  • “Avoid the stall” (recover at first horn, minimal altitude loss).
  • “Understand and live in the stall” (deep stalls, falling‑leaf exercises, spin awareness).
• Strong advocacy for more hands‑on stall/spin/aerobatic familiarization so pilots don’t fear stalls and can manage them instinctively.
• Consensus that a wing‑drop stall at ~15 m AGL is often unrecoverable regardless of skill; the real defense is avoiding that regime on takeoff.

Stall speed vs angle of attack (AoA)

• Repeated point: stall occurs at a critical angle of attack, not a fixed airspeed; indicated “stall speed” varies with weight, CG, configuration, power, icing, etc.
• Some argue GA should universalize AoA indicators; others note FAA now allows relatively easy AoA installs, but uptake is still limited and many airframes are old.
• One commenter incorrectly claims the attitude indicator effectively shows AoA; others correct that it shows pitch vs horizon, not true AoA.

Regulation, equipment age, and safety mandates

• Debate over safety mandates (seatbelts, shoulder harnesses, roll cages, lifejackets):
  • One side resists compulsion and prefers personal choice.
  • Others cite externalities: unrestrained occupants as projectiles, healthcare/insurance burdens, and societal cost of avoidable deaths.
• Some blame FAA conservatism and legacy manufacturers for old tech (leaded engines, antique avionics) persisting; others point out small market size and some recent regulatory easing (e.g., for AoA) as counterbalance.

Accident investigation depth and regulatory follow‑through

• Commenters praise the reconstruction effort: building a similarly modified aircraft with tufts of wool to visualize airflow and characterize the stall.
• This level of detail is described as typical of serious aviation investigations, which systematically eliminate alternate hypotheses.
• Frustration that post‑accident law focused on lifejackets rather than, for example, mandating shoulder harness use on takeoff/landing, which might have preserved consciousness for escape.

Slow‑flight and STOL anecdotes

• Pilots recount extreme STOL performance: Cessnas and Cubs taking off and landing in driveway‑length distances, hovering or even moving backward relative to the ground in strong headwinds.
• The Antonov An‑2 is cited as an exemplar of ultra‑low‑speed, parachute‑like descent behavior, illustrating how far design can push low‑speed controllability—while still not truly eliminating stalls.