Coronal mass ejection impact imminent, two more earth-directed CMEs
A rare G4–G5 geomagnetic storm from multiple coronal mass ejections is prompting both awe at unusually far-south auroras and concern about the resilience of modern infrastructure. Commenters examine likely impacts on power grids, communications, satellites, and aviation, contrasting this event with historical storms like the 1859 Carrington Event and the 1989 Quebec blackout. Much of the debate centers on practical preparedness—water and food storage, off-grid options, and community support—and on how feasible it would be to harden electrical grids and critical systems against a truly catastrophic solar storm.
Event severity and historical context
- The storm reached G4–G5 levels with Kp up to 9, the top of the scale; some sources note this is the strongest since 2003 and the first G4 watch since 2005.
- One paper cited estimates the Carrington Event at Kp ~8.4±0.8 on a logarithmic scale, implying current storms are serious but likely below worst-case historical extremes.
- Past geomagnetic storms (e.g., 1989 Quebec blackout) are referenced as concrete examples of grid impact.
Power grid vulnerability and operator response
- Main concern is geomagnetically induced currents in long conductors: high‑voltage lines, transformers, pipelines, and possibly long undersea cables.
- Several US and international grid operators (PJM, ISO-NE, ERCOT, MISO, AEMO, etc.) issued geomagnetic disturbance warnings and “action” notices, with plans to derate lines and manage load if needed.
- Large transformers are seen as critical bottlenecks: damage could take months–years to repair due to limited spares and specialized crews.
Impacts on technology, aviation, and communications
- Small, disconnected electronics are widely believed to be mostly safe; debate exists over how much CMEs can perturb ground‑level electronics beyond grid‑coupled effects and increased bit flips.
- HF radio propagation and time standards (WWV) were noticeably degraded; D‑layer absorption increased, impacting aviation HF and long‑range comms.
- Aviation risk is framed mainly as modest extra radiation dose on high‑latitude, high‑altitude routes and comms glitches, not acute danger; some uncertainty about exact exposure.
- Starlink and other satellites are expected by some to suffer disruptions; others note operators report no losses so far.
Auroras and visible effects
- Unusually low‑latitude auroras were reported (e.g., much of Europe, parts of North America; claims about Puerto Rico are disputed in‑thread).
- Some regions (e.g., Sweden, parts of North America) reported grid flicker and UPS events coincident with storm onset; unclear in individual cases if CME‑related or coincidence.
Prepping, water, food, and social resilience
- Large subthread explores preparation for prolonged or continental grid failure:
- Emphasis on: stored food, water storage and purification (tanks, rain barrels, filters, pool shock, boiling), small stoves, generators, solar, maps, and well access.
- Considerable debate over realistic water needs (1–8 gallons/person/day) and practicality of long‑term storage versus on‑demand treatment.
- Many argue more than a month‑long outage becomes effectively unsurvivable for most; beyond that, self‑sufficient farming and remote locations matter more than gear.
- Social strategies are split: some stress weapons and personal defense; others emphasize community ties, mutual aid groups, and “two‑weeks ready” style preparation.
- Historical famines and crises are invoked to argue both for human solidarity and for rapid descent into violence; no consensus.
Risk perception and policy
- Several participants argue CME/EMP grid hardening (especially transformer protection and grounding) would be relatively cheap insurance; ballpark figures in the hundreds of millions of dollars are mentioned.
- Debate over how well humanity handles long‑term, low‑frequency risks: some cite ozone and asteroid tracking as successes; others see them as partial fixes and warn of broader systemic denial.