Coronal mass ejection impact imminent, two more earth-directed CMEs

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Event severity and historical context

  • The storm reached G4–G5 levels with Kp up to 9, the top of the scale; some sources note this is the strongest since 2003 and the first G4 watch since 2005.
  • One paper cited estimates the Carrington Event at Kp ~8.4±0.8 on a logarithmic scale, implying current storms are serious but likely below worst-case historical extremes.
  • Past geomagnetic storms (e.g., 1989 Quebec blackout) are referenced as concrete examples of grid impact.

Power grid vulnerability and operator response

  • Main concern is geomagnetically induced currents in long conductors: high‑voltage lines, transformers, pipelines, and possibly long undersea cables.
  • Several US and international grid operators (PJM, ISO-NE, ERCOT, MISO, AEMO, etc.) issued geomagnetic disturbance warnings and “action” notices, with plans to derate lines and manage load if needed.
  • Large transformers are seen as critical bottlenecks: damage could take months–years to repair due to limited spares and specialized crews.

Impacts on technology, aviation, and communications

  • Small, disconnected electronics are widely believed to be mostly safe; debate exists over how much CMEs can perturb ground‑level electronics beyond grid‑coupled effects and increased bit flips.
  • HF radio propagation and time standards (WWV) were noticeably degraded; D‑layer absorption increased, impacting aviation HF and long‑range comms.
  • Aviation risk is framed mainly as modest extra radiation dose on high‑latitude, high‑altitude routes and comms glitches, not acute danger; some uncertainty about exact exposure.
  • Starlink and other satellites are expected by some to suffer disruptions; others note operators report no losses so far.

Auroras and visible effects

  • Unusually low‑latitude auroras were reported (e.g., much of Europe, parts of North America; claims about Puerto Rico are disputed in‑thread).
  • Some regions (e.g., Sweden, parts of North America) reported grid flicker and UPS events coincident with storm onset; unclear in individual cases if CME‑related or coincidence.

Prepping, water, food, and social resilience

  • Large subthread explores preparation for prolonged or continental grid failure:
    • Emphasis on: stored food, water storage and purification (tanks, rain barrels, filters, pool shock, boiling), small stoves, generators, solar, maps, and well access.
    • Considerable debate over realistic water needs (1–8 gallons/person/day) and practicality of long‑term storage versus on‑demand treatment.
    • Many argue more than a month‑long outage becomes effectively unsurvivable for most; beyond that, self‑sufficient farming and remote locations matter more than gear.
  • Social strategies are split: some stress weapons and personal defense; others emphasize community ties, mutual aid groups, and “two‑weeks ready” style preparation.
  • Historical famines and crises are invoked to argue both for human solidarity and for rapid descent into violence; no consensus.

Risk perception and policy

  • Several participants argue CME/EMP grid hardening (especially transformer protection and grounding) would be relatively cheap insurance; ballpark figures in the hundreds of millions of dollars are mentioned.
  • Debate over how well humanity handles long‑term, low‑frequency risks: some cite ozone and asteroid tracking as successes; others see them as partial fixes and warn of broader systemic denial.