Doom didn't kill the Amiga. Wolfenstein 3D did [video]

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Commodore Management and Business Failures

  • Broad agreement that Commodore’s mismanagement, not any one game, killed the Amiga.
  • Cited issues: in‑fighting, power struggles, self‑enriching leadership, R&D budget cuts, weak marketing, and failure to understand that “software sells hardware”.
  • Amiga launched far ahead of competitors, but hardware and Workbench/AmigaOS saw only modest evolution from 1985 to early 1990s.
  • Several commenters argue that with competent management Commodore could have been a peer to Apple in 2024.

Hardware Architecture: Strengths and Traps

  • Early Amiga custom chips (graphics, sound, sprites, DMA) were a huge differentiator; later they became a liability as commodity PC hardware advanced faster and cheaper.
  • Heavy use of ASICs is seen as boxing the platform into slow, expensive iterations.
  • Multiple RAM types (chip vs fast) and tight coupling to the original CPU enabled high performance but made upgrades tricky and error‑prone.
  • Debate: some see the architecture as elegant and powerful; others call it a nightmare once accelerators and third‑party video cards entered.

OS, Stability, and Technical Limits

  • AmigaOS praised for early preemptive multitasking and responsiveness.
  • Major criticisms: no real memory protection, limited MMU use, frequent crashes and “guru” errors for some users, long‑term issues with fragmentation and leakiness.
  • Later attempts (AmigaOS 4, MorphOS) reportedly struggled to retrofit robust process isolation.
  • Some report very stable systems; others recall constant instability, especially in early 1.x days and with heavy 3D or DTP workloads.

Software Ecosystem and Market Position

  • Amiga excelled in games, demos, and some video work (e.g., Video Toaster), but never matched PCs/Macs in mainstream productivity, DTP, or 3D tools.
  • PCs gained “good enough” 2D/3D gaming plus business software on one machine; Macs dominated DTP and high‑end graphics.
  • Lack of strong office penetration and fewer cross‑platform titles hurt both Amiga and Atari; IBM‑compatible PCs were seen as the “serious” choice.

Wolfenstein 3D, Doom, and the Transition to PC

  • Some individuals switched from Amiga to PC specifically after seeing Wolfenstein 3D; others cite Doom, Comanche, or 3D Studio as turning points.
  • Consensus that by the time Wolf3D appeared, Amiga was already commercially “on life support”.
  • Debate over cultural impact: many recall the era as producing “Doom clones,” not “Wolfenstein clones,” even though Wolf3D was pivotal in its moment.

Regional Adoption and Cultural Feelings

  • In the US, Amiga never achieved mass home adoption; more common in niche pro video/graphics roles.
  • In Europe, especially southern Europe, A500/A1200 were ubiquitous gaming machines in the late ’80s/early ’90s.
  • Strong nostalgia and sadness over a perceived “lost path” in computing, alongside critical acknowledgment that PCs eventually caught up and surpassed Amiga for most uses.