Thinking out loud about 2nd-gen email

Feasibility of “Email 2.0” / MX2

• Many see email as already undergoing a slow, de facto “v2” via DMARC/DKIM/SPF and big-provider policies, not via a clean new spec.
• Several argue MX2-like changes could succeed only if Google/Microsoft/Apple/Yahoo push them and bias spam filters toward it; without that, it’s DOA.
• Others think large providers have weak incentives to simplify or reset email, since complexity and lock‑in benefit them.
• Skeptics compare MX2 to IPv6: technically better, but hard to deploy because the legacy system works “well enough.”

Spam, authentication, and power dynamics

• Consensus: spam is the major technical pain; everything else is secondary.
• Many doubt domain-based trust alone solves spam: domains are cheap, and reputation cartels just move from IP lists to domain lists.
• Some say deliverability is effectively a cartel; incumbents use complexity to retain control and sell “access to eyeballs.”
• Ideas floated: stricter SMTP-level rejections, richer status codes, sender‑authorization tokens, or “pickup only” or IM2000-style models; others respond with standard anti‑spam checklists showing likely failure modes.

HTML, formatting, and client behavior

• Strong disagreement about HTML:
  • Marketers and UX‑oriented commenters want standardized, richer HTML (or XML/JSON‑based formats), referencing existing but messy practice.
  • Others want HTML removed entirely or replaced with a constrained subset or lightweight markup; some propose text/markdown or similar.
• Several note decades of failed attempts to standardize HTML for email, citing conflicting interests (marketing, security, Outlook’s Word-based renderer).
• There’s skepticism that plain‑text or Markdown-only email would ever be adopted by marketers, which would hurt adoption of any new standard.

Encryption, identity, and tokens

• Some want any reboot to bake in modern E2EE (Signal-like, OMEMO-like, or better OpenPGP/S/MIME usability).
• Others argue new crypto alone doesn’t fix core problems (key distribution, usability, long-term storage vs. forward secrecy).
• Token- or capability-based models (only authorized senders can email you; revocable per-sender aliases) are discussed, but seen as complex and vulnerable to new abuse patterns.

Self‑hosting, centralization, and regulation

• Many lament that self-hosting is practically blocked by IP/domain reputation and opaque big‑provider filtering.
• Some fear MX2 would further centralize power in a few providers; others say email is already captured.
• Proposals include government‑blessed “secure email v2,” portability mandates for email addresses, or even government-run mail infrastructure.
• A minority suggests abandoning email entirely in favor of newer messaging systems; others defend email’s openness, federated nature, and Lindy‑like resilience.