The Reign of Alexander III of Macedon
Alexander the Great’s military reputation is reexamined through the lens of Bret Devereaux’s longform history writing, with readers weighing how much of his success came from personal brilliance versus the army and institutions he inherited from Philip II. Commenters praise Devereaux’s detailed focus on logistics, sources, and myth-busting (including his work on Sparta), while others criticize his prose as verbose and overly pedantic. Underneath, a broader argument emerges about “Great Man” history, the role of individual agency versus structural advantage, and how modern values reshape our judgments of ancient conquerors.
Language, “To Podium,” and Sports Tactics
- Several comments fixate on the verb “to podium,” with some wanting to eradicate it and others joking about rampant verbing in sports (“to medal,” etc.).
- Wordplay spirals into puns and linguistic jokes, while one commenter nitpicks grammar in the article.
- A coach’s idea that a champion can succeed with just “two actions” is unpacked via fencing: simple, well‑drilled tactics, mixed strategies, and the ability to adjust mid‑attack are emphasized over elaborate plans.
- The “real artists ship” line is disputed: some argue output matters; others cite artists who shipped little or only posthumously (e.g., those discovered after death, one‑hit authors, or reluctant publishers) to show influence ≠ volume.
Quality and Style of the Blog
- Many commenters praise the blog as some of the best, most insightful historical writing online, especially for detailed logistics and strategic analysis.
- Others find it verbose, pedantic, and poorly edited stylistically (not grammatically), with overuse of italics and digressions that obscure the main point.
- Defenders counter that the detail and source‑work are precisely the value, even if this sacrifices concision; absence of professional editing for online prose is noted.
Alexander’s Greatness, Agency, and Luck
- Debate centers on how much credit Alexander deserves versus his father’s army, experienced officers, and favorable circumstances.
- Skeptical voices suggest he might have “gone with the flow” of veteran advisors and benefited from myth‑making and survivor bias.
- Others stress:
- He operated on a far larger geographic and logistical scale than his predecessors.
- He repeatedly made correct battlefield decisions without real‑time input from distant subordinates.
- His officers’ performance dropped sharply after his death, suggesting his personal role was significant.
- There is side debate over exaggerated territory multipliers (e.g., “1000x” expansion); commenters push for more realistic ratios.
- Luck is acknowledged (near‑fatal wounds, battlefield chaos), but most argue his record cannot be explained by luck alone.
Philip II vs. Alexander and the “Great Man” Question
- Some emphasize Philip II’s foundational innovations (army reform, early Persian plans, siege methods), arguing Alexander inherited a “war machine.”
- Others argue actually executing the full conquest, complex sieges, and long‑range campaigns required distinct talent and political adaptability.
- One thread connects this to modern “greats”: environment clearly matters, but commenters debate whether history should still highlight exceptional individuals as “but‑for” figures, both for explanation and as motivating myths.
Paradigms and Historical Understanding
- A quoted teaching model about students first accepting, then over‑rejecting paradigms resonates with commenters.
- Several note that many arguments (including in this thread) stem from clashing paradigms—simple mental frameworks used to manage overwhelming complexity, including in politics.