I sold TinyPilot, my first successful business

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Overall reaction

  • Many readers found the write-up candid, educational, and emotionally satisfying; they appreciated the concrete numbers and transparency.
  • Several long-time followers commented on having tracked the business journey via prior retrospectives and felt personally invested in the outcome.
  • Some were surprised the company was sold “just as it became interesting,” but most agreed the reasons made sense.

Financial outcome & valuation

  • The sale price (~2.4× annual earnings, <1× revenue) struck some as low, especially compared with SaaS multiples (often 4–10×).
  • Others noted that for small hardware/e‑commerce businesses, lower multiples are normal due to real COGS, supply risk, and lack of recurring revenue.
  • Debate over whether selling for ~3 years of profit is wise:
    • One side: could have kept running it and earned more over time.
    • Other side: life stage, stress, and risk justify “booking” several years of income now.
  • Some commenters argued people underestimate transaction costs (broker ~15%, legal, tax) and overestimate how well they could DIY a sale.

Broker, deal structure & process

  • Broker value-add cited: pricing guidance, buyer sourcing, moderating negotiations, managing due diligence.
  • Critics focused on the ~15–18% effective fee and wondered how much of the price uplift was truly due to the broker.
  • Multiple people stressed that without a broker, many founders would fail to close at all or get “taken to the cleaners” by professional buyers.

Founder life, stress, and reasons to sell

  • The sale prep consumed ~10–25 hours/week for months and was reported as more mentally draining than normal operations due to high stakes and unfamiliar reporting.
  • Strategy shifted once selling became likely: only investments with ≤3‑month payoff made sense; long-term improvements (e.g., subscription tooling) were deferred.
  • Key reasons to sell: hardware risk, desire to code more, impending parenthood, and the business taking “20% of time, 90% of stress.”

Hardware vs. software & future direction

  • Strong consensus that bootstrapped hardware is unusually hard: vendor issues, supply shocks, low margins, and high operational overhead.
  • Many commenters advised focusing on SaaS or educational/“pure software” products next, where multiples and margins are better.
  • The discussion highlighted how hard it is to make hardware “passive”; even with outsourcing, someone must continuously manage vendors and fires.

Opportunity cost vs Big Tech

  • A major thread compared lifetime business profits plus exit (~high six figures over several years) to hypothetical FAANG compensation (often estimated far higher).
  • Some saw this as a financial “loss”; others emphasized non-monetary gains: autonomy, learning to build/sell a company, reduced exposure to layoffs, and broader future options.
  • There was sharp disagreement over how much Big Tech engineers typically earn, reflecting common HN tension around salary expectations.