EU: Users who refuse scanning to be prevented from sharing photos and links
EU member states are advancing a “chat control” proposal that would require messaging and social platforms to scan private images and links for child sexual abuse material, with users who refuse scanning losing the ability to share such content. Commenters question the effectiveness of mass client-side scanning against serious offenders, highlight high false-positive risks, and warn about the creation of an infrastructure for broad surveillance that exempts many government and security officials. Several contributions also note that the measure still needs approval from the European Parliament, urging voters to scrutinize candidates’ positions and raising broader concerns about growing authoritarianism and regulatory overreach in the EU.
Scope of the Proposed EU “Chat Control” Law
- Mandatory client-side scanning of images and possibly links for CSAM on major messaging platforms.
- Users who refuse scanning could lose the ability to send or receive photos and links.
- Some services and actors (security authorities, military, politicians, non-profit/self-hosted services) may be exempt, which many see as creating a two-tier system.
Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Authoritarian Drift
- Strong concern that this normalizes mass surveillance and erodes the right to private communication (including references to European fundamental rights).
- Many see a “ratchet” effect: once scanning infrastructure exists, it will be extended (e.g., to copyright, broader policing).
- Comparisons are made to anti-terror and anti-communist laws used as pretexts for expanding state powers, and to historical secret-police regimes.
Effectiveness and Technical Feasibility
- Widespread skepticism that this will meaningfully hinder CSAM distribution.
- Evasion paths mentioned: end-to-end encryption with different clients, self-hosted/open-source tools, encoding images as text, archives hidden in files, or alternate networks (Tor, Usenet, etc.).
- Concern that only unsophisticated users will be caught while serious criminals adapt quickly.
False Positives and Harm to Innocents
- Thread cites reported false positive rates (around 10% in some discussions) and real-world cases where automated CSAM detection led to account bans and investigations.
- Fear that normal family photos (e.g., children swimming) could trigger life-altering investigations.
- Doubts about AI image classification accuracy and the lack of robust, independent appeal mechanisms.
EU Institutions, Process, and Politics
- Clarification that the initiative comes from the Council/Commission and must still pass the European Parliament, which previously blocked similar proposals.
- Debate over how powerful the Parliament really is and whether repeated proposals will eventually pass.
- Calls to use EU elections to support parties opposed to chat control; Pirate Parties frequently mentioned.
Regulation, Big Tech, and Public Response
- Some argue the law is a reaction to perceived tech industry failure to self-regulate CSAM.
- Others say it aligns big tech and governments against users rather than constraining platforms.
- Expectation that most users will simply accept scanning prompts (as with cookie banners), making opt-out a de facto blacklist of “suspicious” people.