More delays for Euston's HS2 station

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Delays and scope cuts to the UK’s HS2 high‑speed rail project, particularly around the Euston terminus, are being held up as a case study in how political interference, flawed accounting rules and fragmented governance can derail major infrastructure. Commenters argue HS2 was primarily about increasing capacity and unlocking regional rail improvements, not just shaving minutes off London journey times, and that cancelling northern legs undermines both economic and environmental goals. The thread widens to compare European and Asian high‑speed rail, question Labour’s nationalisation plans, and highlight how policy choices on roads, ULEZ and rail are perceived as favouring wealthier travellers while leaving poorer regions and users behind.

HS2 Design, Scope, and Mismanagement

  • Many see HS2 as catastrophically mismanaged: excessive tunnelling in rural areas for political reasons, fragmented responsibilities, and poor organisational design.
  • Euston oversite development: costs sit on HS2’s books while property-development profits go to the Treasury, distorting incentives and making sensible station investment look like “overruns”.
  • Some works (e.g. extra unused platforms at Birmingham Curzon Street) are continuing because cancelling would cost even more, highlighting contractual lock‑in.
  • Disclosure of budget envelopes allegedly encouraged contractors to bid at the maximum, unlike HS1 where the internal budget was kept secret.

Political and Institutional Issues

  • Debate over Labour’s role: some argue they should have spent years preparing a detailed rail strategy; others say opposition lacks civil service resources and real‑time project detail.
  • Labour’s nationalisation plan for rail is criticised as vague and bureaucratic, not a clear British Rail–style, integrated strategy or HS2 reintegration.
  • Treasury accounting rules and Whitehall culture are blamed for short‑termism and for “deliberately” hobbling HS2.

Capacity, Connectivity, and the North

  • Strong view: HS2’s main purpose is capacity, not speed—removing express services from existing main lines to free up slots for regional and local trains.
  • Many Northern and “Northern Powerhouse” improvements were contingent on HS2 (directly or via released capacity), so cancellation of Phase 2 undermines wider upgrades.
  • Others argue HS2’s benefits were oversold and that it cannot fix all congestion; some question whether better east‑west links between northern cities might be higher priority.

Euston vs Old Oak Common

  • One camp: Old Oak Common termination would severely worsen many end‑to‑end journeys, adding changes and hassle (especially for connections to Eurostar, Thameslink, Northern/Victoria lines, and key central destinations).
  • Another camp: Crossrail and Overground at Old Oak Common are highly valuable; investments in those networks may offer better returns than forcing HS2 into Euston.
  • Some suggest deep‑level through stations or alternative alignments, but acknowledge the complexity and cost.

Costs, Debt, and Value for Money

  • UK’s high debt, high tax burden, and under‑funded public services are cited as constraints; big new spending must compete with basic repairs (schools, existing rail).
  • Counterargument: continued “austerity” has harmed growth; high‑impact infrastructure like HS2 and systemic rail reform could be exactly what improves long‑term prosperity.
  • One commenter notes HS2’s ~£100bn projected cost vs ~£10bn annual passenger revenue for the entire rail system as strikingly disproportionate.

Comparisons with Other Rail Systems

  • Examples from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, China, Indonesia, and the Netherlands illustrate that:
    • Many countries struggle with city‑centre access, feeder links, and technical or procurement failures (e.g., Dutch Fyra).
    • Others (notably Japan, some Chinese projects) have delivered extensive HSR with far less drama, feeding a perception of UK exceptional underperformance.

Cars, ULEZ, and Modal Priorities

  • “War on drivers” rhetoric surfaces; critics say policy changes (ULEZ, fuel, parking, insurance) fall hardest on poorer drivers who can’t easily upgrade vehicles or switch modes.
  • Others respond that:
    • ULEZ compliance doesn’t require an EV for most cars.
    • Drivers are heavily subsidised via road spending and unpriced externalities (pollution, crashes).
    • Overabundance of cars harms those who can’t afford cars and rely on buses/cycling.
  • Consensus across sides: non‑London transport is poor, and alternatives to driving outside major cities remain inadequate.

Project Delivery and Specification

  • Some advocate “agile” infrastructure: open partial segments early, add stations later.
  • Counterpoints:
    • Retrofitting stations and repeated resignalling can be more expensive than building once.
    • The Elizabeth line already used a phased approach (TfL Rail staging, gradual through‑running).
    • Its large stations and tunnels are defended as appropriately future‑proof; shrinking them 20% is seen as false economy.