More delays for Euston's HS2 station

HS2 Design, Scope, and Mismanagement

• Many see HS2 as catastrophically mismanaged: excessive tunnelling in rural areas for political reasons, fragmented responsibilities, and poor organisational design.
• Euston oversite development: costs sit on HS2’s books while property-development profits go to the Treasury, distorting incentives and making sensible station investment look like “overruns”.
• Some works (e.g. extra unused platforms at Birmingham Curzon Street) are continuing because cancelling would cost even more, highlighting contractual lock‑in.
• Disclosure of budget envelopes allegedly encouraged contractors to bid at the maximum, unlike HS1 where the internal budget was kept secret.

Political and Institutional Issues

• Debate over Labour’s role: some argue they should have spent years preparing a detailed rail strategy; others say opposition lacks civil service resources and real‑time project detail.
• Labour’s nationalisation plan for rail is criticised as vague and bureaucratic, not a clear British Rail–style, integrated strategy or HS2 reintegration.
• Treasury accounting rules and Whitehall culture are blamed for short‑termism and for “deliberately” hobbling HS2.

Capacity, Connectivity, and the North

• Strong view: HS2’s main purpose is capacity, not speed—removing express services from existing main lines to free up slots for regional and local trains.
• Many Northern and “Northern Powerhouse” improvements were contingent on HS2 (directly or via released capacity), so cancellation of Phase 2 undermines wider upgrades.
• Others argue HS2’s benefits were oversold and that it cannot fix all congestion; some question whether better east‑west links between northern cities might be higher priority.

Euston vs Old Oak Common

• One camp: Old Oak Common termination would severely worsen many end‑to‑end journeys, adding changes and hassle (especially for connections to Eurostar, Thameslink, Northern/Victoria lines, and key central destinations).
• Another camp: Crossrail and Overground at Old Oak Common are highly valuable; investments in those networks may offer better returns than forcing HS2 into Euston.
• Some suggest deep‑level through stations or alternative alignments, but acknowledge the complexity and cost.

Costs, Debt, and Value for Money

• UK’s high debt, high tax burden, and under‑funded public services are cited as constraints; big new spending must compete with basic repairs (schools, existing rail).
• Counterargument: continued “austerity” has harmed growth; high‑impact infrastructure like HS2 and systemic rail reform could be exactly what improves long‑term prosperity.
• One commenter notes HS2’s ~£100bn projected cost vs ~£10bn annual passenger revenue for the entire rail system as strikingly disproportionate.

Comparisons with Other Rail Systems

• Examples from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, China, Indonesia, and the Netherlands illustrate that:
  • Many countries struggle with city‑centre access, feeder links, and technical or procurement failures (e.g., Dutch Fyra).
  • Others (notably Japan, some Chinese projects) have delivered extensive HSR with far less drama, feeding a perception of UK exceptional underperformance.

Cars, ULEZ, and Modal Priorities

• “War on drivers” rhetoric surfaces; critics say policy changes (ULEZ, fuel, parking, insurance) fall hardest on poorer drivers who can’t easily upgrade vehicles or switch modes.
• Others respond that:
  • ULEZ compliance doesn’t require an EV for most cars.
  • Drivers are heavily subsidised via road spending and unpriced externalities (pollution, crashes).
  • Overabundance of cars harms those who can’t afford cars and rely on buses/cycling.
• Consensus across sides: non‑London transport is poor, and alternatives to driving outside major cities remain inadequate.

Project Delivery and Specification

• Some advocate “agile” infrastructure: open partial segments early, add stations later.
• Counterpoints:
  • Retrofitting stations and repeated resignalling can be more expensive than building once.
  • The Elizabeth line already used a phased approach (TfL Rail staging, gradual through‑running).
  • Its large stations and tunnels are defended as appropriately future‑proof; shrinking them 20% is seen as false economy.