The U.S. Navy's $100M checkbox (2019)
A fatal 2017 collision involving the USS John S. McCain has become a case study in how bad human–machine interfaces can compound systemic problems like chronic sleep deprivation and undertraining in the U.S. Navy. Commenters debate how much blame belongs to a confusing touchscreen “gang” control for the ship’s twin propellers versus broader organizational and cultural failures, noting that well-designed physical controls and clearer feedback might have prevented the crew’s errors even under stress. The thread also highlights outdated interface standards, poor usability testing, and the irony that the Navy is now moving back to mechanical controls after investing heavily in digital ones.
Root causes of the USS McCain collision
- Many argue the primary causes were chronic sleep deprivation, understaffing, weak training, and poor surface-fleet culture, not just a single checkbox.
- Others maintain the UI significantly amplified risk: in a crisis, a confusing control layout can turn human error into catastrophe.
- Several commenters stress accidents usually have multiple contributing factors; focusing on only UI or only crew performance is misleading.
Touchscreens vs physical controls
- Strong sentiment that touchscreens are inappropriate for primary ship controls: no tactile feedback, harder to read at a glance, vulnerable to latency and “double tap” errors.
- Physical levers/wheels are praised for immediate visual and haptic feedback and discoverability (e.g., you can literally see/feel misaligned throttles).
- Some note the Navy has moved back to physical controls; others say touchscreens can be safe if designed and tested properly.
‘Gang’ checkbox & control-transfer design
- Widely criticized that:
- Each propeller could be transferred independently to different stations.
- The “Gang” (synchronization) checkbox auto‑clears mid‑transfer.
- Control states weren’t clearly synchronized or globally visible.
- Many mariners in the thread call splitting throttles across stations “insane” as a normal-mode feature; such modes should be rare, explicit, and obviously indicated.
Human factors: fatigue, training, and procedures
- Multiple current/former Navy personnel describe extreme, normalized sleep deprivation (e.g., 6‑on/6‑off watches, 36–72 hours awake).
- Aviation and nuclear communities are cited as having better crew-rest practices and post‑mortems than conventional surface forces.
- Poor or self‑study training, vague procedures, and rapid officer turnover are reported as systemic issues.
- Some argue that even with perfect rest, this UI would still be confusing; others say no UI can compensate for operators who are “mentally not there.”
Design philosophy & standards
- Debate over “intuitive” vs expert UIs:
- Complex systems legitimately need dense, expert‑oriented interfaces.
- But the core ship‑handling controls (rudder, throttles) should be simple, consistent, and obvious at a glance, even under stress.
- Several suggest better feedback metaphors (e.g., unified throttles, explicit force‑vector displays, clearer ganging indicators).
- ASTM F1166 and its high allowed touchscreen latency are criticized as outdated and unsafe; standards and review processes are seen as lagging modern UX knowledge.
- Questions are raised about how much HMI testing was actually done and whether Navy customers overrode design concerns.
Article reception & focus
- Some appreciate the article as rare, detailed UI critique of a military system.
- Others think it overemphasizes design, understates the known 7th Fleet readiness/sleep crisis, and reflects limited naval context despite a disclaimer.
- A few argue “good design” is not the exclusive realm of specialists; others say designers are still valuable as tie‑breakers and process leaders.
Meta: irony of the blog’s own UI
- Many complain the article page is nearly unreadable on desktops due to viewport‑scaled font sizes that ignore browser zoom.
- Readers share CSS tweaks and recommend reader mode; several call out the irony of a bad‑UI article on a badly designed site.