The U.S. Navy's $100M checkbox (2019)

Root causes of the USS McCain collision

• Many argue the primary causes were chronic sleep deprivation, understaffing, weak training, and poor surface-fleet culture, not just a single checkbox.
• Others maintain the UI significantly amplified risk: in a crisis, a confusing control layout can turn human error into catastrophe.
• Several commenters stress accidents usually have multiple contributing factors; focusing on only UI or only crew performance is misleading.

Touchscreens vs physical controls

• Strong sentiment that touchscreens are inappropriate for primary ship controls: no tactile feedback, harder to read at a glance, vulnerable to latency and “double tap” errors.
• Physical levers/wheels are praised for immediate visual and haptic feedback and discoverability (e.g., you can literally see/feel misaligned throttles).
• Some note the Navy has moved back to physical controls; others say touchscreens can be safe if designed and tested properly.

‘Gang’ checkbox & control-transfer design

• Widely criticized that:
  • Each propeller could be transferred independently to different stations.
  • The “Gang” (synchronization) checkbox auto‑clears mid‑transfer.
  • Control states weren’t clearly synchronized or globally visible.
• Many mariners in the thread call splitting throttles across stations “insane” as a normal-mode feature; such modes should be rare, explicit, and obviously indicated.

Human factors: fatigue, training, and procedures

• Multiple current/former Navy personnel describe extreme, normalized sleep deprivation (e.g., 6‑on/6‑off watches, 36–72 hours awake).
• Aviation and nuclear communities are cited as having better crew-rest practices and post‑mortems than conventional surface forces.
• Poor or self‑study training, vague procedures, and rapid officer turnover are reported as systemic issues.
• Some argue that even with perfect rest, this UI would still be confusing; others say no UI can compensate for operators who are “mentally not there.”

Design philosophy & standards

• Debate over “intuitive” vs expert UIs:
  • Complex systems legitimately need dense, expert‑oriented interfaces.
  • But the core ship‑handling controls (rudder, throttles) should be simple, consistent, and obvious at a glance, even under stress.
• Several suggest better feedback metaphors (e.g., unified throttles, explicit force‑vector displays, clearer ganging indicators).
• ASTM F1166 and its high allowed touchscreen latency are criticized as outdated and unsafe; standards and review processes are seen as lagging modern UX knowledge.
• Questions are raised about how much HMI testing was actually done and whether Navy customers overrode design concerns.

Article reception & focus

• Some appreciate the article as rare, detailed UI critique of a military system.
• Others think it overemphasizes design, understates the known 7th Fleet readiness/sleep crisis, and reflects limited naval context despite a disclaimer.
• A few argue “good design” is not the exclusive realm of specialists; others say designers are still valuable as tie‑breakers and process leaders.

Meta: irony of the blog’s own UI

• Many complain the article page is nearly unreadable on desktops due to viewport‑scaled font sizes that ignore browser zoom.
• Readers share CSS tweaks and recommend reader mode; several call out the irony of a bad‑UI article on a badly designed site.