Ares Industries – Building low-cost cruise missiles

Moral and political reactions

• Many commenters find the startup “disgusting” or “sad,” seeing it as normalizing cheaper mass killing and emblematic of tech’s drift from “don’t be evil” toward militarism.
• Others argue weapons development is morally necessary in a violent world; opposing weapons is called an incomplete or “faith-based” strategy that ignores ruthless actors.
• Some view YC’s involvement as reprehensible; others applaud YC for backing defense work and “supporting America” amid geopolitical tension.

Deterrence, self‑defense, and Ukraine/Taiwan

• Ukraine’s war shifts some previously anti‑military views: cheap drones and missiles are seen as essential for deterrence and for offsetting an enemy’s numerical advantage.
• Several argue credible military capability is required to prevent invasions (Ukraine, Taiwan, smaller countries vs Russia/China).
• Others warn that cheap, abundant weapons make escalation easier and lower the threshold for political leaders to choose force.

Proliferation, terrorism, and internal security

• Concerns that cartels or non‑state actors could eventually afford cruise‑missile‑like capabilities; others note they already could use autonomous RC aircraft as one‑way weapons.
• Ideas such as “personal Iron Dome” air defenses for wealthy communities are discussed, but seen as largely impractical or illegal under explosives and hazmat rules.

US, imperialism, and who the weapons serve

• One camp frames the US military as the main global bully whose weapons are used to dominate poorer countries and support client states.
• Another sees most of the world living under a US‑provided “umbrella of safety” and argues that potent US and allied forces have underpinned an unusually peaceful era.
• Debates extend to Iran, Iraq, Korea, and the USSR; causes of wars and regime‑change operations are contested.

Technology, cost, and swarming

• Discussion of propulsion: small turbojets vs piston engines, pulsejets, and trade‑offs in speed, detectability, range, and cost.
• Cheap, slower “suicide drones” vs faster jet missiles: quantity can overwhelm ship defenses, especially layered SAM/CIWS systems.
• Anti‑ship focus is defended as having relatively low collateral damage; critics note allies could still misuse such weapons against civilian targets.

Industrial base, China, and attrition

• Commenters stress modern peer war is about industrial output and attrition; reference to reported Chinese “gigafactory”‑scale missile component production.
• Some argue focusing on anti‑ship missiles is mis‑prioritized; the real deficit is long‑range munitions to strike land‑based systems in China.
• Doubts raised whether US startups can match Chinese scale, even if they innovate on unit cost.

Defense industry incentives and careers

• Multiple posts describe current defense procurement as bloated with middlemen, bespoke specs, slow timelines, and misaligned incentives to maximize billable work.
• Some propose that VC‑backed firms that self‑fund R&D then sell products might improve efficiency.
• Practical advice is shared on entering the sector as a developer: get relevant engineering background, security clearance, and join contractors or government programs.