The global surveillance free-for-all in mobile ad data

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Scope of Tracking and Uses

  • Mobile ad and location data are widely available and can identify where people live, work, worship, and travel, often within tens of meters.
  • Law enforcement and government agencies buy these datasets to bypass warrant requirements, then use “parallel construction” (anonymous tips, other agencies) to launder origins of evidence.
  • Commenters describe uses for dragnet policing, “witch hunts” after embarrassing incidents, and potentially for persecution (e.g., people seeking reproductive care, attendees of specific religious sites).
  • Some see legitimate tactical value (e.g., safer arrests, enforcing protection orders), but others argue such uses should still require judicial oversight and narrow warrants.

Effectiveness of Data-Driven Policing and Targeted Ads

  • Several argue huge “data haystacks” are inefficient for serious crime; old-fashioned investigative work often works better.
  • Others suggest more refined ML could help, but multiple commenters question whether targeted digital advertising even works at scale, citing industry skepticism.

Consent, Regulation, and Power Imbalances

  • Strong sentiment that “consent” via ToS and OS prompts is largely fake: people are busy, often low-literacy, and cannot realistically parse complex, shifting policies.
  • Many blame regulatory failure, misaligned incentives, and neoliberal “free market” ideology that prioritizes corporate data extraction over citizen protection.
  • GDPR is mentioned as incomplete; enforcement is patchy even in the EU and irrelevant outside it.
  • Proposals include: criminalizing possession of certain granular data, strict liability for companies when data is abused, and stronger warrant standards; some see this as the only realistic fix.

Mobile Apps, OSes, and Technical Mitigations

  • Apps like GasBuddy and common SDKs quietly ship tracking code; installing any commercial app can effectively install unknown third-party trackers.
  • Some rely on open-source ROMs (GrapheneOS, LineageOS), F-Droid, firewalls (NetGuard), and DNS blockers (Pi-hole, NextDNS, AdGuard Home, DoH/DoT resolvers).
  • Others note limitations: hardcoded DNS/IPs, TLS, OS-level routing leaks (especially on iOS VPNs), app breakage, and general impracticality for most users.
  • Debate over Android vs iOS: iOS’s post-IDFA changes seem to reduce trackability (only ~25% of users allow tracking in cited data), while Android is seen as more permissive by default.

Advertising Itself: Necessary Evil or Structural Harm?

  • One camp views advertising (especially surveillance-based) as a “virus” and pure manipulation that exploits psychology and funds exploitation.
  • Another camp defends advertising as essential market information and a way for small businesses to compete, while condemning hyper-granular tracking and stalking.
  • Several distinguish older, contextual/broadcast ads from modern personalized surveillance ads, arguing the latter are qualitatively more dangerous.