SpaceX Super Heavy splashes down in the gulf, canceling chopsticks landing
Why the chopsticks catch was aborted
- Official mission page says booster boostback was nominal, but “automated health checks of critical hardware on the launch and catch tower triggered an abort,” so it diverted to a planned ocean splashdown.
- Some speculate about tower hardware issues (e.g., a visibly bent antenna) but this is unconfirmed.
- Others suggest safety margins may have been tightened due to many VIPs on site, but this is also speculative.
FTS, splashdown, and recovery
- Commenters note the Flight Termination System (FTS) is meant to end flight safely, not to sink a soft‑landed stage. Failure to terminate in-flight is a regulatory mishap; failure to sink after splashdown is not.
- Reports say the booster was floating; debate on whether SpaceX wants to recover it.
- Arguments against recovery: plenty of telemetry, similar past hardware, expensive and complex maritime handling, and IP protection by leaving hardware on the seabed.
- Others regret that early Starship hardware is effectively disposable but accept it as part of iteration.
Why catch with chopsticks vs ocean/barge
- Main advantages cited:
- Avoid saltwater, which is described as extremely corrosive, especially to engines and hot structures.
- Enable very fast turnaround: catch, lower onto mount, refuel, relaunch.
- Eliminate heavy landing legs; small static “lugs/pins” plus tower-side shock absorbers are much lighter.
- Technical sub‑discussion:
- Catch loads put most of the booster in tension (strong for thin shells) rather than compression (limited by buckling).
- Legs would be long, deployable, need shock absorbers and extra structure at the base.
- Some argue pressurized tanks mitigate buckling and that legged landings remain technically viable; others say any avoidable mass should be cut.
Reusability cadence and economics
- SpaceX rhetoric aims for hour‑scale reuse.
- Supporters say this is needed for:
- Rapid series of tanker launches to refuel one Starship for Moon/Mars missions.
- Potential high‑cadence civil/military point‑to‑point transport.
- Skeptics question:
- Whether global launch demand (currently modest mass to orbit) can justify such a fleet.
- Whether intercontinental passenger rockets make economic or operational sense (noise, safety, comfort, regulations).
- Some view the extreme cadence goals as aspirational or marketing; others expect demand to grow dramatically if cost per kg falls by orders of magnitude.
Technical milestones and test focus
- This flight demonstrated:
- Successful Raptor engine relight in space, previously a concern due to start-up complexity and tank pressurization issues (water/CO₂ ice).
- Modified re‑entry profiles (lower angle of attack) and deliberate changes/omissions in heat‑shield tiles to map margins.
- The trajectory was intentionally just short of a full orbit: enough to test near‑orbital conditions but still guarantee re‑entry over a controlled ocean zone without relying on a deorbit burn.
- No commercial payloads yet:
- Licenses reportedly do not authorize payload delivery.
- Until deorbit and re‑entry are fully controlled, leaving a large, robust vehicle in uncontrolled orbit is seen as too risky.
- A banana and Starlink “pez dispenser” hardware served as symbolic/test payloads.
Safety, interception, and defense
- On interception:
- Starship re‑enters much faster and higher than “standard” AA targets; typical short‑range AA missiles are considered unsuitable.
- Specialized anti‑ballistic systems (e.g., THAAD‑class, long‑range SAMs) are thought capable of interception post‑reentry phase.
- Some question the practicality of Starship as rapid‑reaction military transport, citing visibility of its ballistic‑like trajectory, limited divert options, and existing aircraft alternatives.
Strategic motives and SDI-style theories
- One line of discussion claims Starship/Starlink/Starshield may be an evolution of 1980s Strategic Defense Initiative concepts, aimed at deploying large defensive constellations.
- A detailed rebuttal argues:
- Mars talk predates SpaceX and early US government ties.
- Naming coincidences and small early contracts do not imply a secret SDI revival.
- Modern “Starshield” is described as encrypted government communications/observation, not interceptors.
- Classic SDI is considered technically and strategically flawed (decoys, ASATs, non‑ICBM delivery routes).
- Counter‑replies maintain that defense planners are naturally attracted to such launch capability and that some details would necessarily remain classified.
Timelines, ambitions, and skepticism
- Informal roadmap fragments from the thread:
- More flights in the next year, including V2 hardware and, later, a V3 design tied to Raptor 3.
- Build‑out of a “star factory” and second launch pad to raise cadence.
- Orbital propellant transfer demos are needed to keep NASA lunar lander timelines plausible.
- Aspirational targets include Mars cargo in the mid‑2020s and eventual crewed missions, though many expect slippage into the 2030s.
- Several participants contrast ambitious public timelines (e.g., past lunar flyby and Mars dates) with actual delays, framing current milestones as impressive but still incremental.