The Crime Messenger

Criminal use of encryption

• Many argue criminals will increasingly adopt strong encryption, but others note most criminals are unsophisticated and still use insecure channels (GSM, unencrypted apps).
• Even with perfect crypto, classic methods (infiltration, flipping lower-level members, physical surveillance) still work.
• Large criminal groups or chats (hundreds–thousands of people) are seen as inherently vulnerable to infiltration, regardless of E2E.

Why criminals used niche “secure” phones instead of Signal

• Several commenters are surprised criminals chose bespoke “secure” systems rather than mature tools like Signal.
• Explanations offered: marketing/pitch decks targeted at criminals, desire for fully locked‑down devices, and overconfidence in proprietary systems.
• Some note Signal’s phone-number requirement is a deterrent; others suggest that you don’t hear about criminals who successfully used mainstream E2E apps.

How Sky ECC and similar systems were compromised

• The article and linked sources are described as vague; unclear whether crypto was truly broken or if endpoints/servers were compromised.
• Hypotheses discussed: fake apps, modified devices, server probes, or misuse of “E2E” as just HTTPS.
• Bespoke, secret protocols designed by non‑cryptographers are heavily criticized; “don’t roll your own crypto” is a recurring theme.
• There is interest in a technical post‑mortem; some suspect weaknesses in app design rather than fundamental cryptanalysis.

Law enforcement, privacy, and rights

• Strong backlash to official statements that “privacy is important, but encryption enables crime.”
• One side argues that universal strong encryption hampers ordinary police work and changes the game.
• Others counter that law enforcement has more data than ever (metadata, tracking, etc.), and calls for backdoors are about power, not necessity.
• Debate over tools marketed mainly to criminals: some see that as abetting crime, others stress dual‑use and worry about mass interception of innocent users’ traffic.
• Concern is raised about cross‑border cooperation used to sidestep domestic legal limits.

Infrastructure providers and trust

• OVH is discussed as a weak link: alleged hidden SSH backdoor, past cooperation with law enforcement, and multiple high‑profile takedowns involving servers hosted there.
• Commenters highlight the gap between marketing claims of privacy and behind‑the‑scenes access or cooperation.

Broader reflections

• Some note the irony that criminals might have been safer on stock iPhones with mainstream E2E apps than on “secure” custom phones.
• References are made to talks, podcasts, and books about AN0M and related operations, reflecting strong interest but also skepticism toward official narratives.