The Crime Messenger
Encrypted phone networks like Sky ECC and Anom, marketed as ultra-secure tools for criminals, were quietly infiltrated or controlled by law enforcement, leading to the interception and decryption of billions of supposedly protected messages. Commenters contrast these bespoke, poorly vetted systems with mature tools like Signal, argue that most criminals fail at operational security even with strong encryption, and debate the balance between effective policing and the public’s right to private, unmonitored communication. The thread also raises concerns about government-aligned media framing encryption as inherently dangerous and about cross-border law enforcement tactics that may skirt domestic legal safeguards.
Criminal use of encryption
- Many argue criminals will increasingly adopt strong encryption, but others note most criminals are unsophisticated and still use insecure channels (GSM, unencrypted apps).
- Even with perfect crypto, classic methods (infiltration, flipping lower-level members, physical surveillance) still work.
- Large criminal groups or chats (hundreds–thousands of people) are seen as inherently vulnerable to infiltration, regardless of E2E.
Why criminals used niche “secure” phones instead of Signal
- Several commenters are surprised criminals chose bespoke “secure” systems rather than mature tools like Signal.
- Explanations offered: marketing/pitch decks targeted at criminals, desire for fully locked‑down devices, and overconfidence in proprietary systems.
- Some note Signal’s phone-number requirement is a deterrent; others suggest that you don’t hear about criminals who successfully used mainstream E2E apps.
How Sky ECC and similar systems were compromised
- The article and linked sources are described as vague; unclear whether crypto was truly broken or if endpoints/servers were compromised.
- Hypotheses discussed: fake apps, modified devices, server probes, or misuse of “E2E” as just HTTPS.
- Bespoke, secret protocols designed by non‑cryptographers are heavily criticized; “don’t roll your own crypto” is a recurring theme.
- There is interest in a technical post‑mortem; some suspect weaknesses in app design rather than fundamental cryptanalysis.
Law enforcement, privacy, and rights
- Strong backlash to official statements that “privacy is important, but encryption enables crime.”
- One side argues that universal strong encryption hampers ordinary police work and changes the game.
- Others counter that law enforcement has more data than ever (metadata, tracking, etc.), and calls for backdoors are about power, not necessity.
- Debate over tools marketed mainly to criminals: some see that as abetting crime, others stress dual‑use and worry about mass interception of innocent users’ traffic.
- Concern is raised about cross‑border cooperation used to sidestep domestic legal limits.
Infrastructure providers and trust
- OVH is discussed as a weak link: alleged hidden SSH backdoor, past cooperation with law enforcement, and multiple high‑profile takedowns involving servers hosted there.
- Commenters highlight the gap between marketing claims of privacy and behind‑the‑scenes access or cooperation.
Broader reflections
- Some note the irony that criminals might have been safer on stock iPhones with mainstream E2E apps than on “secure” custom phones.
- References are made to talks, podcasts, and books about AN0M and related operations, reflecting strong interest but also skepticism toward official narratives.