FTC takes action against Gravy Analytics, Venntel for selling location data

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s move against data brokers Gravy Analytics and Venntel for unlawfully selling precise location data has renewed debate over how effectively regulators can police digital surveillance. Commenters question whether the consent decrees have real teeth, especially given the Supreme Court’s rollback of the Chevron doctrine, which may weaken agencies’ ability to set and defend privacy rules in court. Broader concerns center on pervasive tracking by apps, automakers, and data brokers, government access to commercially collected data, and the absence of comprehensive U.S. data protection law.

Scope and Impact of the FTC Order

  • Some readers argue the order is weak: it lacks obvious monetary penalties, doesn’t name the acquiring company (Unacast), and looks like paperwork and reporting rather than true punishment.
  • Others counter that it is a binding consent decree: it explicitly prohibits selling or using “sensitive location data” tied to sensitive locations and applies to current and future officers/agents, effectively shutting down a line of business.
  • Concern that retained “deidentified” or “non‑sensitive” historic data and “consented” data create large loopholes; skeptics expect little practical change and foresee ToS/EULA tweaks to manufacture consent.

Legal Basis and Chevron Deference

  • One thread asks what concrete law requires “verifiable consent” for location tracking.
  • Answer: the FTC is invoking Section 5 of the FTC Act (unfair and deceptive practices), as in many of its cases.
  • Large subthread debates the end of Chevron deference:
    • One side: agencies can still regulate, but courts will now second‑guess technical interpretations, creating inconsistent, politicized rulings and heavier caseloads; this weakens agencies like the FTC/EPA.
    • Other side: Chevron enabled agencies to “make things up” beyond congressional delegations; its rollback is framed as restoring legislative authority and giving regulated parties more legal recourse.
    • Disagreement over whether agency experts or judges are more “political” and which arrangement better manages corruption and error.

Surveillance, Privacy, and Power

  • Many see data brokers as a workaround for warrant requirements: law enforcement and intelligence agencies simply buy granular location and internet data. This is viewed as systemic, entrenched, and unlikely to be dismantled.
  • Some argue focus should shift from corporations to government use of collected data, since the state has coercive power; others stress corporations also profit by selling to government, manipulating users, and entrenching monopolies.
  • Calls for comprehensive, statutory privacy law (GDPR‑style), with real enforcement, revocable consent, provenance tracking, and possibly user royalties; frustration at piecemeal protections (e.g., special treatment for certain “sensitive” locations only).
  • Additional concerns extend to automakers selling telematics/location data and to ubiquitous camera and facial‑recognition systems, raising broader questions about how “free” people really are in a heavily surveilled environment.