2400 phone providers may be shut down by the FCC for failing to stop robocalls

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Clarifying the FCC Action

  • Thread notes the official title is about removal from the Robocall Mitigation Database (RMD), not literally “shutting down” providers, but removal effectively blocks their outbound traffic because others must refuse it.
  • Some ambiguity remains over whether inbound calls/SMS will still work, but many expect affected providers to become unusable or shut down.

Who These Providers Are

  • “Voice service providers” here are mostly small VoIP/telecom outfits, SIP trunking, virtual PBX, local ISPs, CRMs with integrated calling, etc., not the big mobile carriers.
  • Many appear tiny or defunct; some likely exist primarily to support robocallers or as thin “wrapper” companies with upstream carriers handling real infrastructure.

Pace and Adequacy of Enforcement

  • Several commenters say the FCC is moving painfully slowly: companies missed a February 2024 deadline, got a second chance in April, and only now face removal.
  • Others argue regulators intentionally move slowly and procedurally to withstand legal challenges and accusations of overreach.
  • One telecom insider claims most “real” bad actors are absent from this list and that many listed companies already implemented rate limits but simply failed paperwork.

User Experiences with Robocalls and Text Spam

  • Experiences vary widely:
    • Some report dramatic drops in robocalls, but rises in spam SMS/iMessage.
    • Others still get multiple spam calls daily, often in waves or around elections and Medicare enrollment.
    • Many see spikes tied to specific scams (Medicare, parcel delivery, “pig butchering” crypto scams, fake collections).
  • A few users report almost no spam, particularly in some European countries.

Mitigation Tactics and Technology

  • Common strategies:
    • Only answer calls from contacts; send unknown numbers to voicemail.
    • Use carrier spam labels, smartphone features (Android spam folder, iOS silence unknown callers, Visual Voicemail/ live transcription), or Pixel’s automated call screening.
    • Reply “STOP” to SMS, though there’s disagreement: some say this reliably triggers opt-out; others worry it just confirms a live number.
    • Use carrier-lookup tools to identify the originating platform (e.g., Bandwidth, Sinch) and report to them, the FCC, the FTC, and via 7726 for SMS.
  • Some complain that certain platforms (especially Bandwidth and similar API-based carriers) are lax on abuse and hide behind “nothing illegal has been said yet.”
  • Discussion of STIR/SHAKEN:
    • Technically, modern calls can carry signed tokens (similar to JWTs) to authenticate caller ID.
    • Adoption is incomplete; signatures are lost when calls traverse legacy TDM networks, weakening effectiveness.
    • End-user visibility depends on the carrier; some only expose a “verified” icon or filter, not raw data.

International Comparisons and System Design

  • Several European and Nordic commenters report far less spam, credited to stricter regulation and active enforcement.
  • Examples:
    • France recently blocked spoofing of French numbers; spam reportedly dropped sharply.
    • Nordic regulators are praised for effective anti-spoofing and complaint handling.
    • Singapore uses registered SMS identifiers; commenters suggest extending this model to voice.
  • Some see the FCC’s move as the US belatedly converging with EU-style regulation.

Trust, Phone Culture, and Generational Shifts

  • Many people across ages now ignore all unknown numbers; expectation is that serious callers will leave voicemail or text.
  • Others argue this is impractical for parents, freelancers, deliveries, and medical calls; they need to answer unknown numbers or at least review them.
  • Debate over etiquette: some consider calling without prior text increasingly rude outside work contexts; others reject this.

Impact on Legitimate Small Providers

  • Thread notes potential “collateral damage”:
    • Some listed entities only got into the RMD because of a former upstream vendor’s requirements and now rely on another vendor that handles mitigation.
    • Opinions split: some accept collateral damage as acceptable to clean up spam; others warn that casual acceptance of “collateral damage” in regulation is dangerous.
  • General sentiment: enthusiasm that the FCC is finally doing something significant, tempered by skepticism about speed, completeness, and unintended side effects.