Missiles are now the biggest killer of airline passengers

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Scope of the risk: missiles vs other causes

  • Several commenters accept the article’s core claim that missile shootdowns have become a leading cause of modern airliner deaths, especially since 2014 (MH17, PS752, recent Russian‑linked incidents).
  • Others question whether missiles truly “dominate” fatalities versus loss-of-control, CFIT, or design/maintenance failures (e.g., 737 MAX), noting manufacturer stats that still rank pilot/operational issues highest.
  • Some note that counting rules (e.g., excluding deliberate acts) affect which category appears largest.

History of state shootdowns and responsibility

  • Multiple examples cited: USSR/Russia-linked shootdowns (KAL 902/007, MH17, Sibir 1812, others), US shootdown of Iran Air 655, Iranian shootdown of PS752, Ukrainian S‑200 incident over the Black Sea.
  • Debate over “partial responsibility” chains: some argue the US indirectly set conditions for PS752 via Soleimani’s killing; others say this dilutes clear blame for those who actually fired.
  • Long back-and-forth on whether modern Russia should be treated as continuous with the USSR, given legal succession, UN seat, debt, and enduring imperial patterns.

Current Azerbaijan Embraer shootdown discussion

  • Many commenters treat this as almost certainly a Russian air-defense error, citing:
    • Damage patterns similar to other SAM incidents.
    • Azerbaijan’s “external technical influence” wording.
    • Reports of multiple external explosions, shrapnel wounds, and GPS jamming during a drone attack.
  • Others stress remaining uncertainties:
    • Confusing early evidence (some holes petaling outward, long post‑hit flight).
    • Possibility of cannon vs missile vs nearby drone kill.
    • One camp urges waiting for final joint investigation; another predicts a whitewash based on Russia’s past denials.

Air-defense, drones, and identification challenges

  • Long subthread on why militaries are cautious about shooting down “unknown” drones over domestic territory:
    • High risk of hitting civilian aircraft, property, or revealing capabilities; plus legal constraints (Posse Comitatus, civil aviation law).
    • Many “mystery drones” likely misidentified airliners, lidar survey planes, or even stars; commenters see significant public hysteria.
  • Technical discussion:
    • Distinguishing cruise missiles, drones, and airliners via speed, trajectory, and radar returns is nontrivial, especially with old systems and stressed crews.
    • IFF, encrypted spread-spectrum comms, AWACS queries, and low‑probability‑of‑intercept techniques are mentioned, but no system is foolproof.
    • GPS jamming around conflict zones can push aircraft off planned routes and degrade both navigation and identification.

Policy, airspace management, and passenger choices

  • Many argue the core systemic failure is keeping civilian airspace open near active missile/drone operations; Ukraine’s full closure is cited as a counterexample.
  • Others note that airlines sometimes still route over or near warzones for cost and range reasons; some passengers now explicitly avoid flights crossing Russia/Iran, while others consider this unrealistic for “normal” travelers.

Aircraft design and survivability

  • Embraer E‑jets receive praise for robust design and safety record; this crash’s extended survivability is seen as impressive.
  • Comparisons are made (implicitly unfavorable) to Boeing’s recent safety record.
  • Historical cases like United 232 are referenced to show that severely damaged jets can sometimes remain controllable for extended periods.