UK Effort to Keep Apple Encryption Fight Secret Is Blocked

Access to information and legal documents

• Some note the MSN link is awkward on mobile and share the original Guardian piece and the shortened judgment from the UK judiciary site.
• It’s pointed out that the published judgment is only the public summary; a private judgment exists and is not being disclosed by Apple.

Is the UK a “functioning democracy”?

• One side argues the UK is democratic: independent courts, reforms in the last century, and the judiciary forcing openness in this case are cited as evidence.
• Critics point to: first‑past‑the‑post majorities on ~34–43% of the vote, unelected Lords (including failed candidates), extensive CCTV, and creeping authoritarian attitudes toward encryption.
• There is a long sub‑thread debating whether FPTP is democratic or inherently under‑representative, and whether proportional systems are actually better.

Government secrecy, surveillance, and policing principles

• Many see secret hearings over mass surveillance as incompatible with democratic norms and with “policing by consent” in the Peelian tradition.
• Gagging Apple while compelling it to weaken privacy is compared to secretly creating a “Stasi”.
• Others argue some secrecy in governance is unavoidable, but what can be kept secret must be constantly reviewed.

Apple, other tech firms, and defaults

• Several defend Apple for challenging the order in court and for withdrawing Advanced Data Protection (ADP) from the UK rather than building backdoors.
• Others criticize Apple for participating in secret proceedings and for having strong encryption only as an opt‑in default.
• Concern is expressed that companies like Google and Meta may be less willing to resist similar pressure; WhatsApp’s past public stance in favor of E2EE is noted.

Encryption, backdoors, and the “middle ground” question

• A common view: with modern cryptography there is no real middle ground—either communications are secure for everyone, including criminals, or they are not secure for anyone.
• Many argue any government-access scheme (key escrow, master keys, provider‑held copies like BitLocker’s cloud‑stored keys) is effectively a backdoor that will leak or be abused.
• Counter‑arguments invoke analogies to house keys or bank deposit boxes, claiming it’s acceptable if a trusted custodian can unlock data under warrant; opponents stress this scales very differently in the digital realm and creates huge breach targets.

“Nothing to hide” vs. privacy as a right

• Several detailed replies dismantle the “nothing to hide” argument:
  • People underestimate how sensitive and easily misinterpreted their data is, especially out of context or when processed by algorithms.
  • Privacy is needed to protect dissidents, minorities, and future opponents of an authoritarian turn, not just current wrongdoers.
  • Surveillance produces chilling effects (“I don’t want to end up on a list”) and can be weaponized against lawful criticism.
• One participant openly says they accept some loss of privacy so police can tackle organized crime; others respond that serious criminals will simply move to other tools, leaving only ordinary citizens exposed.

Effectiveness and limits of surveillance

• Many argue the “going dark” narrative is exaggerated:
  • Law enforcement can still search devices, deploy malware, surveil suspects physically, exploit metadata, or compromise endpoints—just not effortlessly at population scale.
  • Broad data collection and AI‑driven analysis threaten to turn targeted warrants into full population monitoring.
• Some note that despite heavy UK surveillance, everyday crime remains high, suggesting mass data collection is a poor substitute for better social policy and traditional policing.

Courts, headlines, and framing

• Several commenters express relief that judges blocked secrecy, seeing the judiciary as a crucial check even if it’s intentionally undemocratic in structure.
• The MSN headline is criticized as misleading; the Guardian’s version is praised as clearer and less sensational.