How the US built 5k ships in WWII

Romanticization of Wartime Mobilization vs Reality

• Some commenters find WWII mobilization “romantic”: unified national purpose, everyone “pulling in the same direction,” an antidote to today’s “bullshit jobs” and drift.
• Others strongly reject this: that unity was purchased with ~400k American dead, mass coercion, rationing, censorship, and repression; they prefer finding individual purpose without being drafted into “a vast government project of destruction.”
• Internment of Japanese Americans, killings in camps, Port Chicago, and race riots are cited as evidence that the era was neither harmonious nor admirable.
• Suggested reading/interviews (e.g., Studs Terkel’s work) are recommended as antidotes to rose‑tinted views.

Top‑Down Purpose, Authoritarianism, and Governance

• One camp argues strong top‑down direction (citing China, Singapore, South Korea) can channel “latent potential” and give people purpose, as in WWII production.
• Critics see “latent authoritarianism” in this view: collective purpose rhetoric is often used to justify repression and enrich elites.
• Debate over whether unity comes from real belief vs cynical elites using propaganda; concern that “true believers” in a cause can be even more dangerous.
• Several note post‑9/11 unity and early COVID as modern examples of intense but short‑lived alignment, with disastrous or mixed results (Iraq, polarization).

Industrial Capacity: Then vs Now

• Quantitative comparisons show modern Chinese and Korean shipbuilding dwarf WWII US output in gross tonnage; some argue US wartime production looks modest by today’s standards.
• Others counter that Liberty ships were crude, short‑lived transports, not comparable to modern complex warships.
• Discussion that US shipyards today suffer from low pay, poor conditions, and huge turnover, slowing builds despite demand and backlogs.
• Environmental, labor, and safety regulations are cited as both a civilizational gain and a constraint on recreating WWII‑style industrial surges.

Naval Strategy and Future Warfare

• Concern that the US now relies on a small number of highly complex “exquisite” platforms that would be quickly attrited in a high‑end war.
• Some advocate a shift to “swarms” of cheap systems (drones, small missile boats), noting Pentagon efforts like the Replicator Initiative.
• Ukraine is used as a testbed example: drones, sea drones, and precision munitions shaped by electronic warfare capabilities; carriers seen by some as “sitting ducks.”

Lessons of WWII and Deterrence

• Extended argument over whether WWII teaches “hit strong aggressors early” (e.g., stop Russia in 2014, stop Hitler pre‑Poland) vs the danger of constant interventions and escalation with nuclear powers.
• One side emphasizes that weakness or delay invites war; the other that over‑aggression helped cause the world wars and could trigger catastrophe today.
• Underneath is a shared premise: large‑scale war now would be catastrophic, and industrial capacity plus deterrence, not nostalgia for WWII mobilization, should guide planning.