The World War Two bomber that cost more than the atomic bomb
World War II’s B-29 Superfortress emerges here as both a technological marvel and a case study in the staggering cost and human consequences of airpower, with its development exceeding the Manhattan Project and its conventional firebombing of Japan killing at least as many people as the atomic bombs. Commenters debate the effectiveness and morality of strategic bombing, the myths around “precision” attacks, and whether nuclear strikes shortened the war or mainly signaled power to the Soviets. The thread also contrasts the B-29’s innovation and production scale with later platforms like the F‑35 and B‑2, highlighting how military technology, doctrine, and procurement have evolved while remaining enormously expensive.
B-29 capability, reliability, and cost
- Thread notes the B-29 as a huge technical leap: pressurized, high-altitude, analog fire-control computers for each turret, ECM gear, and very powerful but temperamental engines (magnesium parts, fire risk).
- Early B-29s were almost hand-built; massive quality issues (leaks, wiring faults, only ~20% flyable off the line).
- Some argue that if B-29s had been available earlier in Europe, bomber crew mortality might have been lower, but others point out the B-29 was initially very unreliable—at one point training losses in the US exceeded combat losses.
- Cost comparisons: B-29 program vs Manhattan Project; commenters also compare to the F‑35 and B‑2 as modern “most expensive weapons,” discussing program totals vs unit cost.
Strategic bombing, precision vs area bombing
- Several comments emphasize that prewar US doctrine envisioned daylight “precision” bombing (helped by the Norden bombsight), but in practice accuracy was poor and target selection flawed.
- The Norden sight is described as a major but ultimately disappointing investment, leading to a shift toward area bombing and massive civilian casualties.
- Others reference British night area bombing and German/Japanese resilience: both increased weapons output despite bombing by dispersing industry.
Atomic vs conventional bombing of Japan
- Some posters initially assume atomic bombs were uniquely destructive; others note that the Tokyo firebombing killed as many or more than either atomic strike.
- Debate over whether Hiroshima and Nagasaki were deliberately “saved” as atomic targets; one side cites orders placing them off-limits in July 1945, another stresses that was only a month before the attacks.
- Strong disagreement on motives:
- One camp: bombs primarily to shock Japan into surrender and avoid a catastrophic invasion, citing Okinawa, coup attempts, and Japanese cabinet deadlock even after two bombs.
- Another camp: Japan was already strategically finished and the bombs also (or primarily) signaled power to the USSR.
- Multiple commenters stress that Japanese leadership understood these were atomic weapons and feared more might follow.
WW1 vs WW2 leadership and “incompetent generals”
- Extended subthread challenges the common “lions led by donkeys” view of WW1:
- One side argues generals were not uniquely incompetent; they were adapting to rapidly changing tech (artillery, machine guns), with poor comms and massive armies.
- Opponents point to huge casualties, failure to internalize lessons from the US Civil War, and rigid offensive doctrines.
- Consensus that high-intensity industrial war tends to produce horrific casualty rates regardless of era.
Industrial scale and modern analogies
- Commenters marvel at wartime US production (e.g., bombers rolling out nearly one per hour) and contrast it with today’s slower, more complex acquisition.
- Threads branch into comparisons with modern systems (F‑35, B‑52 longevity, B‑2 maintenance) and side debates about US vs European manufacturing quality (including cars and aircraft).