How Airbus took off
Airbus’s rise is examined as a rare European industrial-policy success that now outperforms Boeing in commercial aviation, aided by a newer single-aisle airframe, strong safety culture, and effective cross-border engineering collaboration. Commenters contrast this with Boeing’s shift toward financial engineering, outsourcing, and decisions like stretching the aging 737 platform and relying on software fixes, which culminated in the 737 MAX crises and recent quality scandals. The exchange also touches on broader themes of state support vs. “unregulated” capitalism, the limits of innovation in large incumbents, and whether emerging players like China’s COMAC could eventually disrupt the Airbus–Boeing duopoly.
Airbus vs Boeing: who “took off”?
- Several commenters ask whether Airbus truly “won” or Boeing mainly imploded.
- The delivery charts are cited: Airbus’ rise began ~25 years ago, long before Boeing’s recent crises.
- Key advantage noted: Airbus had a newer single-aisle design with enough ground clearance for modern engines, while Boeing kept stretching the 737 instead of funding a clean-sheet replacement.
- Boeing’s handling of the Bombardier CSeries is framed as a major strategic blunder that handed Airbus another strong product.
737 MAX, “airframe” arguments, and safety failures
- Long subthread debates whether the MAX fiasco was an “airframe problem” or an integration/software/training problem.
- One side: the 737 airframe is excellent and well‑matched to the market; the real issue was mixing it with incompatible engines and then hiding aerodynamic instability behind MCAS.
- Other side: the low ground clearance is now fundamentally incompatible with 21st‑century engine needs; making it work required dangerous compromises, so calling the airframe “great” is misleading.
- Related issues raised: grandfathered systems (e.g. lack of modern EICAS), anti‑ice certification delays, door‑plug failure, outsourced manufacturing (Spirit, fuselage rings), and Southwest’s “no-simulator-training” contract incentives.
Culture, organization, and politics
- Airbus is described as unusually good at putting customers first despite being a political project: early adoption of English and US standards, tough choices on engines and workshare.
- Some describe an engineering‑driven culture where day‑to‑day politics felt limited; others report intense sniping, especially in “innovation” offshoots. One theory: mistrust and internal adversarialism help avoid groupthink.
- French/German collaboration is seen by some as complementary (creative but sloppy vs process‑rigid but precise), though others report Airbus as a slow, bureaucratic, multi‑national maze.
Industrial policy, capitalism, and “European conservatism”
- Thread contrasts Airbus’ state-backed, safety‑first, conservative model with Boeing’s financialization, outsourcing, and Wall Street pressure.
- Some argue this exposes a failure mode of US‑style capitalism; others note Airbus also had serious scandals and is itself a product of state‑driven mergers and subsidies.
- The article’s portrayal of Europe as a “graveyard of failed champions” is heavily disputed; commenters point to many large European firms and to Concorde/Ariane as important, if imperfect, precursors.
Future competition and broader innovation
- COMAC’s slow progress is mentioned as one to watch, especially if China solves the engine issue.
- Some expect eventual disruption of the duopoly via new tools and automation, if regulators allow it.
- Several commenters question big‑tech “innovation” narratives, arguing legacy tech giants now resemble complacent Boeing more than fast‑moving upstarts.