Early US Intel assessment suggests strikes on Iran did not destroy nuclear sites

Effectiveness of the strikes and bunker‑buster limits

• Many point out that known centrifuge halls are ~70–80m underground while public specs for the GBU‑57 suggest ~60m ideal penetration, so full destruction was unlikely, especially in hard rock.
• Others argue that real performance is classified and modeling/BDAs are complex; sequential “drilling” with multiple bombs into the same shaft could increase effective reach.
• Counter‑view: even with drilling, you’re still constrained by basic physics, aircraft payload, and geology; ultra‑high‑performance concrete and solid mountain rock give the defender the edge.
• Several note that bomb damage assessment for underground targets is notoriously hard; images show holes in a mountain, not internal damage. Limited bomb inventory is also highlighted.

Status of facilities and uranium stockpile

• Thread cites reports that much enriched uranium was moved ahead of the strike, but others doubt Iran could do that unobserved given Israeli surveillance.
• There’s disagreement over whether stockpiles are under rubble, moved to other sites, or “missing”; both Israeli and Western leaks are seen as politically motivated and unsubstantiated.
• Multiple commenters emphasize that you can’t “destroy” U‑235—only disperse it. Blowing up a stockpile might turn it into a difficult but recoverable “uranium mine,” delaying but not eliminating capability.

Politics, media, and intelligence spin

• Some see the operation as primarily domestic theater: enabling Trump to look reluctantly “tough,” then retroactively selling a success narrative.
• The White House’s rejection of its own leaked assessment and a canceled classified briefing are read as signs the public messaging can’t be squared with intel.
• US mainstream media are criticized as captured and war‑friendly, with anti‑war voices pushed to small outlets and social media.
• Commenters note selective trust in intelligence: embraced when it justifies action, dismissed when it undercuts it.

War, escalation, and incentives for nukes

• Many argue the strikes increase Iran’s motivation to get a bomb; North Korea and post‑Budapest‑Memorandum Ukraine are used as cautionary examples.
• Others say Iran could instead fully disband its nuclear program to remove the casus belli, though skeptics call that unrealistic given regional power politics.
• Personal accounts of Iraq/Afghanistan casualties and PTSD fuel strong anti‑war sentiment and fears of repeating past interventions.

Diplomacy, JCPOA, and compliance

• One camp blames US withdrawal from the JCPOA and targeted killings of negotiators for collapsing a working containment framework and making rearmament rational for Iran.
• Another stresses IAEA findings of past undeclared material and activities, arguing Iran was never fully compliant and used the deal as cover.
• There’s broader concern that attacking NPT‑party facilities—without clear public evidence of weaponization—undermines the entire non‑proliferation regime.

Technical side debates

• Long sub‑threads dissect penetration math, rock fracturing, sequencing of six bombs per shaft, use of air ducts as “blast channels,” and possible blast doors/compartmentalization underground.
• Some argue enriched to ~60% means Iran now needs far fewer centrifuges and could relocate to smaller, covert sites, making future detection harder even if major complexes were badly damaged.